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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to determine if low performing Central Florida
teachers, according to Florida VAM scores, had related instructional practice evaluations
that were being used to determine placement on improvement plans in the 2013-14
school year. Additionally, the feedback held within the instructional practice evaluations
was analyzed to discover the levels of feedback most frequently rendered by
administrative evaluators to the lowest performing teachers. Deidentified data from a
population of 528 Central Florida teacher evaluations and improvement plans within the
lowest 10% of VAM scores for the 2013-14 school year were gathered from a Florida
Department of Education database and public record requests. Data were analyzed to
determine if any significant relationship existed between VAM scores and instructional
practice scores. A very weak relationship existed between these two variables. Tenured
teachers were rated significantly more favorably on summative instructional practice
evaluations than nontenured teachers. Within the population, fewer than 1% of lowperforming teachers (two total) were prescribed an improvement plan, regardless of
tenure or nontenure status. Finally, evaluation feedback was largely low-level without
reference to student growth or achievement.
Evidence of administrative barriers within the three dimensions of individual
conflict avoidance, bureaucratic procedural interferences, and administrative procedural
faults were inferred from the literature and subsequent findings. To improve upon the
current evaluation system, administrators must be aware of, and well-prepared for the
demands of evaluating, remediating, and providing feedback to teaching professionals
iii

relative to student achievement and growth in a manner that is simultaneously respectful,
candid, fair, timely, and actionable.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
It has become apparent throughout this journey that not one person earns any
achievement alone. There are a great many people who have motivated me, mentored
me, been my greatest friends, and remained my most steadfast companions. To all who
have had a hand in this journey, who have marked on my map, and who have helped
direct the steering wheel, who carried me when I was weary- I am forever grateful to you.
To my parents, Roger and Lynn Butler: who always have been my greatest
champions, who have made me into the woman I am, who have shaped and molded my
character, who have believed in me and my choice to become a public educator- despite
your initial caution in my choosing of this profession- I love you.
To my dissertation chair, Dr. Barbara Murray: who I attribute to allowing me to
become the educational leader I was always meant to be, for showing me what it means
to be brave, for showing me how to stand up for what is true- I am inspired by you.
To my dissertation committee- Dr. Lee Baldwin, Dr. Walter Doherty, Dr. Cynthia
Hutchinson, and Dr. Kenneth Murray: your guidance and thoughtful examination of my
work on one of the most important journeys of my life has been the opportunity of a
lifetime- I am in awe of you.
To my principal, Dr. Cheryl Salerno: for providing me the forum and opportunity
to initiate thought into practice, for being a trailblazer in the educational community of
Volusia County, for being “the woman in the arena,” for being concurrently bold,
passionate, and kind- and for always considering the prime interest of students above all
else- I admire you.
v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... viii
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ........................................................... x
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1
Background of the Study ........................................................................................ 1
Statement of the Problem ........................................................................................ 5
Purpose of the Study ............................................................................................... 6
Significance of the Study ........................................................................................ 6
Definition of Terms................................................................................................. 9
Theoretical Framework ......................................................................................... 14
The Social Systems Theory of Administrative Behavior ......................... 14
Nomothetic and Idiographic: Competing Dimensions ............................. 15
Role-Personality, Role, and Personality Conflicts .................................... 17
Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Satisfaction ............................................... 20
Leadership and Followership Styles ......................................................... 22
Morale ....................................................................................................... 23
Research Questions and Hypotheses .................................................................... 24
Limitations ............................................................................................................ 25
Delimitations ......................................................................................................... 27
Organization of the Study ..................................................................................... 28
CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE .................................................................... 29
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 29
Understanding the Context of Teacher Evaluation in the Current Era of Reform 30
The Lake Wobegon Effect .................................................................................... 32
The Case for Using Value-Added Modeling to Rate Teacher Performance ........ 35
Barriers to Candid Teacher Evaluation Practices ................................................. 37
Individual Conflict Avoidance .................................................................. 38
Bureaucratic Procedural Interferences ...................................................... 43
Administrative Procedural Faults ............................................................. 48
Summary ............................................................................................................... 53
CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY .................................................................................... 54
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 54
Purpose of the Study ............................................................................................. 54
Research Questions ............................................................................................... 55
Selection of Subjects and Population.................................................................... 56
Instrumentation ..................................................................................................... 58
Florida’s Value-Added Model (VAM) ..................................................... 58
vi

Florida Instructional Personnel Evaluation Requirements ....................... 60
Florida Instructional Personnel Contract Types ....................................... 62
Levels of Feedback ................................................................................... 64
Data Collection ..................................................................................................... 65
Data Analysis ........................................................................................................ 66
Summary ............................................................................................................... 68
CHAPTER 4 PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA ..................................... 69
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 69
Overall Descriptive Statistics ................................................................................ 70
Research Question 1 ............................................................................................. 71
Research Question 2 ............................................................................................. 79
Research Question 3 ............................................................................................. 81
Research Question 4 ............................................................................................. 83
Summary ............................................................................................................... 85
CHAPTER 5 SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................. 90
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 90
Summary of the Study .......................................................................................... 90
Discussion of the Findings .................................................................................... 93
Research Question 1 ................................................................................. 93
Research Question 2 ................................................................................. 97
Research Question 3 ................................................................................. 99
Research Question 4 ............................................................................... 102
Implications for Policy and Practice ................................................................... 106
Recommendations for Future Research .............................................................. 109
Summary ............................................................................................................. 112
APPENDIX A UCF INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD EXEMPTION OF
RESEARCH.................................................................................................................... 114
APPENDIX B SAMPLE LETTER FOR PUBLIC RECORDS REQUESTS ............. 116
APPENDIX C SAMPLE RUBRIC FOR FEEDBACK DETERMINATION RATING
......................................................................................................................................... 118
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................ 120

vii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Florida Value-added Example of Score Determination .................................... 59
Figure 2. Histogram of Value-added Model (VAM) Score Frequencies Observed ......... 73
Figure 3. Histogram of Instructional Practice Score Frequencies Observed .................... 75
Figure 4. Scatterplot of Value-added (VAM) Scores as Related to Instructional Practice
Scores ................................................................................................................................ 78
Figure 5. Pie Chart Representing Percentage of Teachers Prescribed an Improvement
Plan ................................................................................................................................... 82

viii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 Characteristics of Study Population .................................................................... 57
Table 2 Research Questions, Research Methods, Variables, Data Sources, and Data
Analysis............................................................................................................................. 67
Table 3 Pre- and Post-Data Collection Frequencies of Study Teachers by County: 201314....................................................................................................................................... 71
Table 4 Frequencies and Percentage of Teachers by Instructional Practice Rating
Category ............................................................................................................................ 74
Table 5 Pearson Correlation Coefficients: VAM Scores and Instructional Practice
Scores ................................................................................................................................ 76
Table 6 Frequency and Percentage of Teachers by Contract Status ................................ 79
Table 7 Mean and Standard Deviation for Instructional Practice Scores of Tenured
versus Nontenured Teachers ............................................................................................. 80
Table 8 Independent Samples Test Comparing Mean Instructional Practice Scores for
Tenured vs. Nontenured Teachers .................................................................................... 81
Table 9 Frequencies and Percentages of Highest Feedback Levels Observed ................ 85
Table 10 Research Questions, Variables, Data Sources, Methods of Analysis & Results
........................................................................................................................................... 88
Table 11 Comparison of Prior Research as Related to Teacher Effectiveness Ratings.... 95

ix

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
AC:

Annual Contract

CC:

Continuing Contract

CFPSBC:

Central Florida Public School Board Coalition

FDOE:

Florida Department of Education

LIFO:

Last In First Out

NCLB:

No Child Left Behind

NGA:

National Governors Association

PC:

Probationary Contract

PSC:

Professional Service Contract

RTTT:

Race to the Top

SAT:

Stanford Achievement Test

VAM:

Value-Added Model

x

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Background of the Study
The National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future proposed “Within a
decade- by the year 2006- we will provide every student in America with what should be
their educational birthright: access to competent, caring, and qualified teaching in schools
organized for success” (National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future, 1996,
p. 10). The commission found that the teaching profession had been greatly neglected
and required restructuring at its foundation, deeming that effective and quality teachers,
the most important ingredient in education reform, was most often overlooked (DarlingHammond, 1996). Three years after this goal was supposed to be realized, Race to the
Top required in 2009 that participating states begin rewarding both highly effective
teachers and administrators using a value-added model (VAM) of student achievement in
order to define and quantify teacher effectiveness (Harris, Ingle, & Rutledge, 2014, p.
74). In the state of Florida, Senate Bill 736 (also known as the Student Success Act,
which became Florida Statute §1012.34) was passed in 2011 and required VAM scores to
account for 50% of the overall teacher evaluation, with local instructional practice scores
determined by school administrators to comprise the remaining 50% (Florida State
Senate Bill 736, 2011). These initiatives were passed with the understanding that student
achievement measures are important factors when evaluating teachers and making highstakes decisions about teachers’ careers (Harris et al., 2014). Florida Statute §1012.34
was subsequently revised and, at the time of the present study, required that at least onethird of the overall teacher performance evaluation be based upon data indicators of
1

student performance via VAM scores. At least one-third was required to be based on an
instructional practice score decided by school-based evaluators. The final one-third may
be compiled considering other indicators of performance. These indicators included
professional and job responsibilities recommended by the State Board of Education or
identified by the district school board, peer reviews, objectively reliable survey
information from students and parents based on teaching practices that were associated
with higher student achievement, and other valid and reliable measures of instructional
practice (Florida Statute §1012.34, 2015).
The use of VAM scores to determine teacher effectiveness is a fairly new idea
grounded in the belief that teacher effectiveness is directly and significantly correlated to
student achievement. Although instructional practice evaluations have been in place for
decades, there is little evidence to support that these evaluations reliably identify
ineffective teachers with respect to student achievement outcomes. For example, in a
study conducted in Pennsylvania, 98.2% of teachers received a perfect evaluation score
when districts used the Pennsylvania State Education Department’s standard rating form
(Langlois & Colarusso, 1988). Specific to Florida, Mela (2013) found, within a
population of 1,138 teachers in Brevard County, that 99% were rated effective or highly
effective. More recently, Pace (2015), in a similar Brevard County study, found that
administrators rated 92.5% of all teachers as effective or highly effective on the
professional practices portion of the county’s state-approved teacher evaluation
instrument. These local teacher evaluation scores were in stark contrast to mounting
research indicating the average number of incompetent teachers to be between 5% and
2

15% (Tucker, 2001). In May 2012, nine California public school students filed a
statewide lawsuit that struck down five laws governing tenure, dismissal, and layoff
procedures that were said to protect approximately 3% of “grossly ineffective teachers”
(Vergara v. California Final Judgment, 2014, p. 8). The final judgment in this case
surmised “…the number of grossly ineffective teachers has a direct, real, appreciable, and
negative impact on a significant number of California students, now and well into the
future, for as long as said teachers hold their positions” (Vergara v. California Final
Judgment, 2014, p. 8). This contrast has led researchers to suspect that inflated teacher
evaluations are a common and strong indicator that teacher supervision and evaluation
are dysfunctional systems that do not appropriately address poor teacher performance
(Langlois & Colarusso, 1988).
The Lake Wobegon Effect is characterized by “a phenomenon in which most
individuals or groups perform above average” (Wheeler & Haertel, 1993, p. 82). In this
case, the Lake Wobegon Effect is manifested when nearly all teachers are deemed
effective or highly effective by their performance evaluation despite contradictory
evidence displayed by low student achievement measures (Tucker, 1997; Wheeler &
Haertel, 1993). Three key dimensions have surfaced from the literature as contributors to
the Lake Wobegon Effect of inflated teacher performance evaluations: (a) individual
conflict avoidance, (b) bureaucratic procedural interferences, and (c) administrative
procedural faults.
First, individual conflict avoidance has been defined as an administrative
personality flaw or lack of will that causes an avoidance of conflict and discomfort when
3

conducting face-to-face performance critiques necessary to achieve the institutional goal
of increasing student achievement (Donaldson, 2010; Getzels & Guba, 1957). Second,
bureaucratic procedural interferences occur when state and local district policies and
personnel do not fully support school-based administrative actions and decisions intended
to tackle ineffective performance (Donaldson, 2010; Getzels & Guba, 1957). Finally,
administrative procedural faults are credited for instances in which administrators do not
accurately and appropriately document teacher instructional practice with fidelity, leading
to grievances and costly legal union battles when administrators do take action to dismiss
ineffective teachers. It is important to note that the key difference between individual
conflict avoidance and administrative procedural faults is that, though individual conflict
avoidance translates to a lack of will to relay high-quality and candid feedback on
performance, administrative procedural faults account for a lack of skill in the delivery of
high-quality feedback (Donaldson, 2010).
When school administrators fail to make the required decisions to eliminate
ineffective teachers, the administration becomes the critical factor behind poor student
achievement measures (Fuhr, 1993). Generally, across public school systems,
accountability is one-directional: from the administrator to the teacher (Futernick, 2010).
However, Elmore (2002) proposed a more promising approach, stating that
administrators should be equally and reciprocally responsible for teacher performance
accountability, effectively raising the bar for all school personnel to develop capacity for
increased human capital:
For every increment of performance, I demand from you, I have an equal
responsibility to provide you with the capacity to meet that expectation.
4

Likewise, for every investment you make in my skill and knowledge, I have the
reciprocal responsibility to demonstrate some new increment in performance.
This is the principle of ‘reciprocity of accountability for capacity.’ It is the glue
that, in the final analysis, will hold accountability systems together. (p. 5)
The primary role of evaluation is to provide evidence for administrators in making
a binary decision: to recommend for teacher retention or non-retention (Range, Duncan,
Scherz, & Haines, 2012). It is the responsibility of school-based evaluative
administrators to ensure teacher effectiveness within schools and take actions to
remediate or dismiss ineffective teachers using student achievement data. When the role
of evaluation is compromised, evaluations become far less meaningful and impactful to
the central purpose of a school as an institution: cultivating student achievement. The
three dimensions of individual conflict avoidance, bureaucratic procedural interferences,
and administrative procedural faults acting in tandem manifest the Lake Wobegon Effect
within a school system. They reinforce ineffective teaching and administrative behaviors
that contribute to a sub-par teacher workforce with low student growth and achievement
outcomes.
Statement of the Problem
To date, limited research has been conducted on how Florida value-added model
(VAM) student achievement data, instructional practice evaluation ratings, feedback, and
improvement plans have been used to determine and remediate teacher performance.
Additionally, there is little known regarding how barriers to candid and appropriate
feedback, (i.e., individual conflict avoidance, bureaucratic procedural interferences, and
administrative procedural faults), contribute to administrative decisions to assign teachers
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with low VAM scores to improvement plans and subsequently pursue the dismissal of
such ineffective teachers.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to determine if grossly ineffective teachers,
according to Florida VAM scores, had related instructional practice evaluations that were
being used to determine placement on improvement plans. Additionally, this study
served to determine if there was a difference between professional service
contract/continuing contract (tenured) and annual contract/probationary contract
(nontenured) teacher instructional practice scores and assignment to improvement plans
for teachers within the lowest 10% of VAM scores in Central Florida school districts.
Finally, the levels of feedback held within the local district performance evaluations and
improvement plans were reviewed to search for evidence of administrative barriers
within the three dimensions of individual conflict avoidance, bureaucratic procedural
interferences, and administrative procedural faults that exist and inhibit administrative
evaluators from providing candid and actionable teacher performance evaluations relative
to student growth and achievement.
Significance of the Study
Federal legislation mandated in Race to the Top that participating states use VAM
measures of student achievement to determine a portion of overall teacher and
administrative effectiveness ratings (Harris et al., 2014). Although teachers have the
greatest impact on student achievement, administrators also have an immense effect on
student success with regard to making decisions about which teachers are hired and
6

allowed to maintain their position in the classroom (Range et al., 2012). As a result of
the accountability movement, there has been an increased need for specific research on
the leadership actions of school administrators and the use of teacher evaluation systems
(Ovando & Ramirez, 2007). Tucker (1997) stated: “Principals have the ultimate
responsibility to ensure minimal standards of teacher competency” (p. 105). Following
this logic, administrators have been charged with the instructional and ethical leadership
task of building human capital by hiring and firing instructional personnel, and
facilitating remediation methods for teachers to improve their practice (Range et al.,
2012, p. 303).
However, Weisberg, Sexton, Mulhern, Keeling, & New (2009) proclaimed: “A
teacher’s effectiveness- the most important factor for schools in improving student
achievement- is not measured, recorded, or used to inform decision making in any
meaningful way” (p. 31). As VAM scores in Florida have been released since the 201112 school year and used to contribute to overall individual teacher evaluation scores, a
more quantitative measure has been introduced with respect to teacher effectiveness,
providing more insight as to who the teachers are that may be considered grossly
ineffective according to student growth and achievement outcomes.
Historically, instructional practice evaluations have been conducted with little
distinction “…between great teaching from good, good from fair, and fair from poor”
based on short, infrequent classroom observations (Weisberg et al., 2009, p. 3). The
outcome has been, “…on paper, almost every teacher is a great teacher” (Weisberg et al.,
2009, p. 3). Many researchers have sought to find out why ineffective teachers remain in
7

the classroom long after they should have been rightfully dismissed. Fuhr (1993)
declared, “Principals don’t like to talk about the marginal or incompetent teacher. No
one likes to admit these [teachers] exist in a school” (p. 26). Moreover, taking action
against grossly ineffective teachers who exist within school systems requires “courage,
honesty, knowledge, and hard work” on behalf of all administrative personnel involved
(Staples, 1991, p. 142). Bridges (1993) found in a study of school principals “About 3045 percent of administrators will not confront a bad teacher and tell them they are doing a
bad job” (p. 36). Furthermore, Mock and Melnick (1991) surveyed principals and found
that 50% would, if permitted, replace between 3% and 10% of their staff. However, 94%
of the principals surveyed reported giving less than 2% of teachers an unsatisfactory
rating. More compelling were the findings of Tucker (1997) who determined a
comprehensive teacher evaluation did not ensure that a principal would address and
respond to incompetence. According to Brieschke (1986), most of the principals
included in a study reported that they “…tried to avoid involving themselves in the
lengthy, time-consuming, complicated, and tension-producing procedure of removing a
teacher from the school because the process often did not end in the desired result” (p.
244).
Ineffective teachers remaining in the classroom is, in part, a result of a
dysfunctional system that permits, and even compels, the leadership within schools to
continue providing low-level, non-confrontational drive-by feedback on teacher
performance evaluations (Langlois & Colarusso, 1988). This leaves accountability
systems ineffective, empty, ritualistic practices that rarely mark teachers as ineffective,
8

and less often prescribe improvement plans or dismissal despite mounting student growth
and achievement evidence (Langlois & Colarusso, 1988).
The present study was significant as it aimed to provide insight as to how
incompetence observed by Florida teacher VAM scores was correlated to local district
instructional practice evaluations conducted by school administrators. The researcher
also sought to provide deeper understanding and recommendations as to what could be
done to ensure administrators were using evaluative tools appropriately to increase
teacher performance and accountability, thereby providing a system and environment that
ensured a competent teacher is in every classroom. Overall, the goal of this study was to
discover if lack of leadership was an indicator of a dysfunctional system that permits
ineffective teachers to remain in the classroom.
Definition of Terms
Annual Contract: A type of teaching contract in the state of Florida, which are the
only contracts that may be offered to instructional personnel hired after July 1, 2011 for a
period of one school year, in which the district school board may choose to award or not
to award without cause (Florida Statute §1012.335(1), 2015). For the purpose of this
study, the term “annual contract” may be used interchangeably with “nontenured.”
Dismissal: Refers to “…the termination for cause of any tenured teacher or a
probationary teacher within the contract period” (Cambron-McCabe, McCarthy, &
Thomas, 2004, p. 286).
Classroom Teachers: Staff members assigned the professional activity of
instructing students in courses in classroom situations, including basic instruction,
9

exceptional student education, career education, and adult education, including substitute
teachers (Florida Statute §1012.01, 2015).
Continuing Contract: A type of teacher contract that may be held by any
employee in the state of Florida who held continuing contract status prior to July 1, 1984
(Florida Statute §1012.33(4)(a), 2016). Any Florida teacher holding continuing contract
status prior to July 1, 1984 shall be entitled to retain such contract and all rights arising
therefrom as prescribed by the State Board of Education, unless the employee voluntarily
relinquishes his or her continuing contract (Florida Statute §1012.33(4)(a), 2016). Any
member of the district administrative or supervisory staff and any member of the
instructional staff, including the school principal, who is under continuing contract may
be suspended or dismissed at any time during the school year; however, the charges
against him or her must be based on immorality, misconduct in office, incompetency,
gross insubordination, willful neglect of duty, drunkenness or being convicted or found
guilty of, or enter a plea of guilty to, regardless of adjudication of guilt, any crime
involving moral turpitude, as these terms are defined by rule of the State Board of
Education (Florida Statute §1012.33(4)(c), 2016). For the purpose of this study, the term
“continuing contract” may be used interchangeably with “tenured.”
Feedback: “Information about how we are doing in our efforts to reach a goal”
(Wiggins, 2012, p. 11). Furthermore, feedback must “…provide information specifically
relating to the task or process of learning that fills the gap between what is understood
and what is aimed to be understood” (Hattie & Timperley, 2007, p. 82).
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Grossly ineffective: Term used in the Vergara v. California (2014) final judgment
to describe roughly one to 3% of teachers in the state of California that substantially
undermine the ability of a child to succeed in school. Furthermore, the final judgment of
this case declared “…Considering the effect of grossly ineffective teachers on students,
as indicated above, it therefore cannot be gainsaid that the number of grossly ineffective
teachers has a direct, real, appreciable, and negative impact on a significant number of
California students, now and well into the future, for as long as said teachers hold their
positions” (Vergara v. California Final Judgment, 2014, p. 8). For the purpose of this
study, grossly ineffective teachers are classroom teachers with the lowest 10% of VAM
scores in 13 Central Florida school districts, as observed by the Florida Department of
Education database for 2013-2014.
Instructional Leadership: The primary role by which school leaders impact
student success: by helping teachers improve their practice (Range et al., 2012). A series
of administrative behaviors that include: making suggestions, giving feedback, modeling
effective instruction, soliciting opinions, supporting collaboration, providing professional
development activities, and rendering praise for effective teaching (Blase & Blase, 2000).
Instructional Practice Scores/Ratings/Feedback: Performance evaluations that are
conducted by school-based administrative personnel using a system that is state-approved
for rating teacher instructional performance (Florida Statute §1012.34, 2015). Each
evaluation system must be designed to support effective instruction and student learning
growth, and provide appropriate instruments, procedures, timely feedback, and criteria
for continuous quality improvement of the professional skills of instructional personnel
11

(Florida Statute §1012.34, 2015). These performance evaluations require a summative
rating of (a) highly effective, (b) effective, (c) needs improvement (or, for instructional
personnel in the first three years of employment who need improvement, developing), or
(d) unsatisfactory (Florida Statute §1012.34, 2015).
Probationary Contract: A type of teaching contract which may be offered for a
period of one school year to instructional personnel upon initial employment in a school
district (Florida Statute §1012.335 (1)(c)). For the purpose of this study, the term
“probationary contract” may be used interchangeably with “nontenured.”
Professional Service Contract: A type of teaching contract which was only offered
to instructional personnel hired prior to July 1, 2011 and shall be renewed each year
unless the district school superintendent, after receiving recommendations required by
Florida Statute §1012.34, (a) charges the employee with unsatisfactory performance and
notifies the employee of performance deficiencies as required by the statute; (b) the
employee receives two consecutive annual performance evaluation ratings of
unsatisfactory within a three year period; or (c) three consecutive performance
evaluations of needs improvement or a combination of needs improvement or
unsatisfactory (Florida Statute §1012.33 (2)(c), 2015 & Florida Statute §1012.33
(3)(a)(b), 2015). For the purpose of this study, the term “professional service contract”
may be used interchangeably with “tenured.”
School Administrators: School principals or school directors who are staff
members performing the assigned activities as the administrative head of the school and
to whom have been delegated responsibility for the coordination and administrative
12

direction of the instructional and non-instructional activities of the school (Florida Statute
§1012.01 (3)(c)(1), 2015). Assistant principals who are staff members assisting the
administrative head of the school are also included in this definition. This classification
also includes career center directors (Florida Statute §1012.01(3)(c)(2), 2015). For the
purpose of this study, school administrators are those who perform the managerial and
instructional leadership responsibility of directing employees’ work, planning the work
schedule, controlling the flow of work or materials, train employees, handle complaints,
authorize payments, and appraise productivity and efficiency of employees (Florida
Statute §1012.01(7), 2015).
Teacher Effectiveness: Quantitatively measured in two ways: using value-added
measures of student achievement and growth via standardized test scores, and using
evaluation ratings rendered by administrative personnel who supervise schools (Torff &
Sessions, 2009, p. 127). Effective teachers are those whose students experience high
academic growth, while the students of less effective teachers experience less academic
growth (Stronge, Ward, & Grant, 2011, p. 339). In Florida, teacher effectiveness is
currently measured by using at least one-third of the total evaluation according to the
teacher’s value-added model score, at least one-third of the evaluation comprising an
instructional practice score deemed by administrative observations, with the remaining
one-third to be determined by other performance indicators (Florida Statute §1012.34,
2015).
Value-Added Model: “… a class of statistical procedures that use longitudinal test
score data, i.e., data collected over a period of time, to measure the change in a student’s
13

performance during a specific period of time” (Doran & Izumi, 2004, p. 3). According to
the Florida Department of Education, the value-added score represents a positive or a
negative percentage figure that compares the difference between predicted student
performance and actual student performance as a result of an individual teacher (Florida
Department of Education, 2015). For example, a value-added model score of zero means
that a student’s performance was exactly as predicted. A negative value-added model
score means that the student’s performance fell short of the prediction, and a positive
value-added model score means that the student’s performance exceeded the prediction.
Theoretical Framework
The Social Systems Theory of Administrative Behavior
To understand the relationship between low student achievement measures and
school leadership response to ineffectiveness, the researcher reviewed numerous writings,
theories, and concepts that set the foundation for this study. From this research, Getzels
and Guba’s (1957) social systems theory of administrative behavior provided the best
blueprint in recognizing and defining the social behaviors in the administrative process
grounded within this study. Getzels and Guba’s research rested on the premise that there
are multiple components that contribute to a behavior exhibited by an administrator, and
balancing these components is necessary in order to achieve institutional goals (Getzels
& Guba, 1957). The groundwork for social systems theory is the innate conflict and need
for balance between the nomothetic and idiographic dimensions of a social system
(Getzels & Guba, 1957).

14

Nomothetic and Idiographic: Competing Dimensions
Getzels and Guba (1957) asserted that every institution is a social hierarchy
encompassing both nomothetic and idiographic dimensions. Nomothetic dimensions are
the dimensions in which the observed behavior and the goal are completely rolereferenced. That is, the most direct route to achieving a goal is by having an established
hierarchy and clear-cut expectations of behavior in order to reach a desired state. In the
case of a school, the simplified hierarchy is the role of the administrator as the
superordinate and the role of the teacher as the subordinate. Teachers are held
accountable for goal achievement and direction toward purpose by their supervisors who
are normally the school principals or assistant principals.
Furthermore, every institution has a purpose that resonates from the bottom to the
top of the structural hierarchy (Getzels & Guba, 1957). In the case of a school system the
institutional purpose is to educate students. Further, in the current age of accountability
with regard to public education systems, the purpose is stretched from educating students
to increasing student achievement. In Florida, student achievement accountability
measures include individual and quantitative teacher effectiveness ratings known as
VAM scores. Therefore, the goal of administrators and teachers alike is to increase
student achievement as observed in VAM scores. There is, however, another component
to teacher effectiveness: instructional practice scores deemed by administrators (often
principals and assistant principals). If the function, purpose, and goal of any educational
institution is to educate students and increase student achievement, behaviors within each
role must be observed that directly lead to realization of the goal on behalf of both
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teachers and the administrators. In the case of the school, the administrator holds the role
of supervisor and evaluator, and the teacher holds the role of the subordinate and
evaluatee. In terms of leadership and followership, the administrator’s role is to “write
the book,” (Getzels & Guba, 1957, p. 436) and the teacher’s role is to do things “by the
book” (Getzels & Guba, 1957, p. 436). The nomothetic dimension is very black and
white--there are behaviors that are required, and conversely, there are behaviors that are
prohibited within roles of the social system (Getzels & Guba, 1957). With reference to a
school institution, the behaviors that are required are ones which meet the goal of
increasing student achievement, and the prohibited behaviors are any behavior that does
not increase student achievement. The administrator must supervise, evaluate, and give
performance feedback. The teacher, on the other hand, must achieve results.
Alternatively, there is the idiographic dimension associated with social systems
theory. Whereas the nomothetic dimension places importance on the purpose of the
institution as a machine-like system that achieves a goal, the idiographic dimension
places importance on the understanding that all institutions are peopled, and the people
are the key in realization of a goal (Getzels & Guba, 1957). The idiographic dimension
deals exclusively with the individual needs and personalities of the people within the
institution (Getzels & Guba, 1957). This dimension recognizes that the people within an
organization are the “flesh-and-blood” that realize goals, and that no two people are
exactly alike in terms of personality and needs. The needs of administrators are not only
to achieve the goal of increasing student achievement, but also to create a sense of
belonging and high morale between all stakeholders within the institution to develop
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human capital. One might refer to the need of administrators as creating an institution
that keeps teachers happy and feels natural and harmonious, thus making their own roles
enjoyable without exerting a significant amount of strain and psychic energy (Getzels &
Guba, 1957).
Here lies the dilemma for administrators: the conflict between balancing the
nomothetic and the idiographic dimensions of a social system. Getzels and Guba (1957)
wrote a general equation for observed administrative behavior: B = f (R x P), where B
represents behavior observed, R represents the given institutional role defined by
expectations (or nomothetic dimension), and P represents the personality of the particular
role incumbent (or idiographic dimension). According to this formula, the school
administrator is viewed to be caught between an individual and institutional conflict of
roles and expectations (supervision, evaluation, and feedback toward the goal) versus his
or her own personality and needs (harmony and belongingness), and must achieve a
balance of both role and personality in order to exhibit behavior conducive to
achievement of the institutional goal (Getzels & Guba, 1957). This notion was illustrated
by Getzels and Guba (1957):
The unique task of administration, at least with respect to staff relations, is just
this: to integrate the demands of the institution and the demands of the staff
members in a way that is at once organizationally productive and individually
fulfilling. (p. 430)
Role-Personality, Role, and Personality Conflicts
Getzels and Guba (1957) explained social systems theory by elaborating on three
different but interconnected sources of conflict that an administrator may encounter while
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trying to merge and balance the nomothetic institutional and idiographic individual
dimensions: role-personality conflicts, role conflicts, and personality conflicts.
Role-personality conflict occurs when administrators feel they must choose
between the nomothetic expectations and fulfillment of individual needs, creating a
lopsided equation B = f (r x P) or B = f (R x p). If administrators favor the nomothetic, B
= f (R x p), and become entirely role-oriented in pursuit of the institutional goal, they are
said to be “autistic” in the sense that they completely ignore the personal integration
aspect of administration and do not communicate with one another (Getzels & Guba,
1957). However, if administrators choose to maximize the personality aspect of the
equation, B = f (r x P), they become “…liable for unsatisfactory role adjustment” Getzels
& Guba, 1957, p. 431) and considered unable to perform the role expectations. For the
present study, role-personality conflicts has been referred to as “individual conflict
avoidance.”
The second source of conflict is role conflict which manifests in three distinctive
ways. First, role conflict can appear when there is disagreement within groups in
defining the administrator’s role, as best exemplified by Getzels and Guba (1957):
For example, the principal of the school may be expected by some teachers to
visit them regularly for constructive help and by others to trust them as
professional personnel not in need of such supervision. (p. 432)
Additionally, conflict becomes apparent when there is disagreement among
several power-rendering groups regarding the right each has to define the expectations for
the same role, thereby representing contradictions in the expectations of two or more
roles held by the same administrator (Getzels & Guba, 1957). For a school-based
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administrator, examples of the groups that have the right to define that administrative role
are the school board, the superintendent, and the teachers’ unions, to name a few. Each
of these groups not only has the right to define the role of the administrator, but each
group also holds enormously different expectations for the same role.
Furthermore, another type of input resulting in conflict is contradiction within
administrators when they are required to fulfill more than one role (Getzels & Guba,
1957, p. 432). For principals or assistant principals, being both mentors and evaluators to
teachers create role conflict because administrators assume the role of the caring and
helpful advisors to teachers who are struggling.. Also, however, they understands that
they may be faced with the unsavory task of conducting a summative evaluation for a
struggling teacher with the end result being possible dismissal. This type of conflict is
referred to in this study as “bureaucratic procedural interferences.”
The final sources of conflict are personality conflicts. Personality conflicts occur
due to unique personality characteristics that detach the individual from the institutional
purpose and goal, leaving the person “… to work out personal and private needs and
dispositions, however inappropriate these may be to the goals of the social system as a
whole” (Getzels & Guba, 1957, p. 432). This creates incongruence between the
nomothetic and idiographic dimensions; the two ends simply do not meet, leading to
administrative failure and a loss in institutional productivity (Getzels & Guba, 1957).
When school administrators exhibit personality conflicts, they cannot reconcile their own
needs as a person with the roles they are expected to perform. They may see no reason
for the expectation placed upon them to supervise and evaluate staff because, due to their
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own personalities, they find it difficult to call attention to the shortcomings of their
subordinate teachers. For the purpose of this study, personality conflicts are henceforth
referred to as “administrative procedural deficiencies/faults.”

Effectiveness, Efficiency, and Satisfaction
Getzels and Guba (1957) further elaborated on the nomothetic and idiographic
dimensions in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction. Effectiveness is
directly linked to the nomothetic role-centered dimension, whereas efficiency is linked to
the idiographic side of the equation, and satisfaction transpires when the role expectations
and the needs of the individual meet (Getzels & Guba, 1957). That is, one can be
effective without being efficient, and vice versa, and one can also be satisfied within both
the nomothetic and idiographic dimensions without ever being effective or efficient
(Getzels & Guba, 1957).
Effectiveness is defined as reaching the goal or institutional purpose by behaving
in such a way that is commensurate with role expectations (Getzels & Guba, 1957).
Conversely, ineffectiveness it the opposite--the behaviors exhibited by the person to not
meet the role expectations as defined by the institutional goal (Getzels & Guba, 1957).
For the purpose of this study, school administrators can be said to be ineffective when
they do not exhibit evaluative behaviors that move instructional staff closer to reaching
the goal of increasing student achievement.
Efficiency is directly linked to the needs and behavior or the idiographic
dimension (Getzels & Guba, 1957). In terms of an administrator, the needs dimension
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must match the behavior in order for the administrator to maintain the efficiency needed
to supervise a school and the “flesh and blood” teachers that reside within it:
When behavior conforms to the needs dimension, it appears “natural,” even
pleasurable, and is forthcoming with a minimum of strain or expenditure of
psychic energy. In this sense, the behavior is efficient. When the behavior
conforms to the expectations dimension and there is a gap between expectation
and needs, behavior is “unnatural,” even painful, is if forthcoming with a
maximum of strain and expenditure of psychic energy. In this sense, the behavior
is inefficient. (Getzels & Guba, 1957, p. 434)
When an administrator must evaluate a subordinate (i.e., teacher) and bring forth
shortcomings via critical performance feedback directed to the teacher, it is a very
unnatural behavior. It is one that is inherently difficult for the administrator, causing
stress and inefficiency even though the feedback might be quite effective. In contrast,
giving positive performance feedback is very natural and pleasurable for the
administrator, thus rendering it efficient. It may, however, be ineffective in terms of
reaching the institutional goal of increased student achievement.
Finally, the balance between effectiveness and efficiency results in overall
satisfaction of the administrator must be considered (Getzels & Guba, 1957, p. 435). One
is said to reach maximum satisfaction when the nomothetic dimension of the role and its
expectations complements the idiographic individual needs dimension perfectly (Getzels
& Guba, 1957). When this occurs, administrators are able to fulfill their roles in terms of
their personalities without any conflict.. They are able to meet their personal needs and
the expectations of the institution with great satisfaction, rendering the administrator both
effective and efficient. This further results in behaviors that will reach the institutional
goal (Getzels & Guba, 1957).
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Leadership and Followership Styles
The next dimension of social systems theory elaborates on all the aforementioned
components as related to leadership-followership styles (Getzels & Guba, 1957).
According to Getzels and Guba (1957), there are three types of leadership-followership
styles--the nomothetic, the idiographic, and the transactional. The nomothetic style is
based on role expectations without regard for need-dispositions by means of clear “black
and white” expectations as the direct route to social behavior. The idiographic style is
based on the need-dispositions without regard for the role expectations via deliberately
vague and informal expectations (Getzels & Guba, 1957). The transactional style
emerges as a balanced approach that satisfies both the role and personality factors in the
behavior equation (Getzels & Guba, 1957).
In the transactional style of leadership-followership, there are clear-cut
expectations set forth by leaders for their followers, but there is also high regard for the
“flesh and blood” aspect--that the institution’s ability to reach its goal is incumbent upon
those who comprise the institution (Getzels & Guba, 1957). The transactional style is the
middle ground of leadership style, satisfying both the nomothetic and the idiographic
dimensions, but it is also the most difficult for an administrator to navigate:
“Expectations are defined as sharply as they can be but not so sharply as to prohibit
appropriate behavior in terms of need-dispositions” (Getzels & Guba, 1957, p. 438). It is
important to note that school administrators must be transactional in their leadership
craft. All teachers are different; no two are alike. Therefore, expectations must be within
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the Goldilocks zone: sharp without stifling the individual art of teaching, but not too dull
as to release the teacher from accountability for low student achievement measures.
Morale
It is natural for school leaders to wish to maintain high levels of morale among
staff and within themselves. Morale is an important component to the social systems
theory as it evokes feelings of identification and belongingness between people,
institutions, and goals (Getzels & Guba, 1957). However, morale can only be achieved
when the role expectations for the people within the institution are logically appropriate
and the people within the institution experience a sense of identification of their personal
needs within the goal (Getzels & Guba, 1957). When these two ends meet to a great
degree, the morale within the institution is high. However, when one of these factors is
zero, according to Getzels and Guba, morale can never be high, and motivation to reach
said goal will be nonexistent.
In terms of school administrators and teacher evaluations, administrators need to
realize the rationality of their role expectations within the evaluation system as a relevant
component toward reaching the goal. If they do not, their morale will be low and
evaluations will become more of a process to be completed than a process critical to the
goal of student achievement. Similarly, if administrators do not identify the goal of
student achievement within their own needs and values, motivation will be low and
morale will also suffer.
In summary, the framework for this study was built using social systems theory as
set forth by Getzels and Guba (1957). Administrators must reconcile between the
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nomothetic and the idiographic dimensions of a social system so that their roles and
personalities are balanced with those of their subordinates. Furthermore, administrators
must recognize and appropriately react to various forms of conflict, including rolepersonality conflicts, role conflicts, and personality conflicts, (i.e., individual conflict
avoidance, bureaucratic procedural interferences, and administrative procedural
deficiencies/faults), to maintain an effective, efficient, and satisfying work environment
for the institution and the people held within it. Finally, leaders must develop a
transactional leadership style that extends balance of their role expectations and the needdispositions against those of subordinates in order to create a sense of belongingness for
all constituents, hence maximizing morale. Administrators walk a tightrope, moving
toward the goal of increased student achievement while also candidly evaluating
subordinates in ways that do not diminish the individuality of teaching and learning but
hold subordinates accountable for their behaviors that do not coincide with reaching the
overarching institutional goal. Within this theoretical framework, the problem of balance
between the nomothetic and the idiographic inherently exists as a contributor to the
observed disparity among value-added measures of teacher performance and instructional
practice scores specified by administrators.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
Following are the research questions that were used to guide this study:
1. What relationship, if any, exists between the lowest 10% of teachers’ VAM
scores and instructional practice evaluation scores in Central Florida school
districts?
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H01: There is no observed relationship between the lowest 10% of teachers’
VAM scores as correlated to local instructional practice scores within Central
Florida school districts.
2. What difference, if any, exists between professional service
contract/continuing contract (tenured) and annual contract/probationary
contract (nontenured) teachers’ instructional practice scores within Central
Florida school districts?
H02: There is no observed difference between professional service
contract/continuing contract (tenured) and annual contract/probationary
contract (nontenured) teachers’ instructional practice scores within Central
Florida school districts.
3. What percentage of professional service contract/continuing contract (tenured)
and annual contract/probationary contract (nontenured) teachers identified
with the 10% of lowest VAM scores in Central Florida school districts have
been placed on improvement plans?
4. Does the feedback reflected in the instructional practice evaluations and
improvement plans target student achievement for teachers with the lowest
10% of VAM scores in Central Florida school districts?
Limitations
The researcher identified the following limitations for this study:
1. The Florida Department of Education (FDOE) VAM score data for 2013-2014
excluded some teacher names. According to an information file held within
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the documents delivered to the researcher, some individual teacher names
were masked for any teacher who is exempt from public record disclosure per
Florida law. The FDOE cited the following Florida Statutes for these
exemptions: §119.071 (2)(j), (4)(d), and (5)(i); §265.605; and §267.17.
2. The researcher relied on local school districts for accurate and complete
school district evaluation and improvement plan data. Some quantitative and
qualitative data may not be present in the information provided by the local
school districts if this information was not held within the personnel files of
individual teachers at the district-level offices.
3. Research question two was asked to determine if there was an observed
significant difference between tenured and nontenured teachers’ instructional
practice scores. The only two variables that were analyzed and investigated to
respond to this question were contract status, and the instructional practice
score of each teacher in the population. Extraneous variables, such as years of
teaching experience and corresponding VAM scores for each teacher were not
included in the data findings.
4. Charter school employees were removed as selected subjects due to charter
school employee personnel records not being housed within local school
district offices. Thus, this study was limited strictly to traditional public
school teachers and did not include any subjects who worked in a charter
school for the 2013-14 school year.
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5. Of the 758 total teachers identified in the population, 230 teachers were
removed from this study due to a variety of limiting factors, such as: (a)
incomplete personnel files held within school district central offices, yielding
missing information for subjects; (b) termination of employment prior to
completion of the 2013-14 school year summative instructional practice
evaluations; (c) retirement of employees prior to the completion of the 201314 school year summative instructional practice evaluations; and (d)
duplicates of teacher names within the original VAM score data from the
FDOE due to part-time employment at multiple schools.
6. Marion County School District and Lake County School District teachers
were eliminated from the population due to lack of contract statuses being
produced by these school district central offices via public record request.
Delimitations
This study was delimited by the following factors:
1. This study was restricted to the 13 counties represented by the Central Florida
Public School Board Coalition (11 counties represented once Marion and
Lake County school districts were eliminated from the total population).
2. The personnel records examined for the purpose of this study were those of
public school teachers with the lowest 10% of VAM scores for each of the
Central Florida school districts described according to FDOE data sources for
the 2013-14 school year.
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3.

The VAM data, local instructional practice evaluations, and improvement
plan data from the 2013-2014 school year were accessed under Florida Statute
§119.07 via public record requests made to the FDOE Division of
Accountability Research and Measurement and each individual school district.
Any data that was exempt from this statute could not be obtained for this
study.
Organization of the Study

This research study is presented in five chapters. Chapter 1 includes the
background of the study, statement of the problem, purpose of the study, significance of
the study, definition of terms, theoretical framework, research questions, limitations, and
delimitations. Chapter 2 contains a review of the literature which includes individual
conflict avoidance, bureaucratic procedural interferences, and administrative procedural
faults. Chapter 3 describes the methodology used in this research study. Chapter 4
presents the findings and data analyses from the five research questions. Finally, Chapter
5 provides a summary of the entire study, discussion of the findings, implications of the
findings for theory and practice in school administration, and recommendations for
further research.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Introduction
At the time of the present study, the use of Valued-added Model (VAM) scores to
determine teacher effectiveness was a fairly new idea grounded in the belief and recent
legislation that student achievement was directly and significantly correlated to teacher
effectiveness. A Nation at Risk, published in 1983, drew interest in reforming teacher
evaluation in connection with merit pay to address “the rising tide of mediocrity”
(Donaldson, 2009, p. 4). More than 20 years later, United States Secretary of Education
Arne Duncan proposed that districts begin reporting the percentage of teachers rated in
each evaluation performance category in response to the growing concern that students,
and teachers by extension, are underperforming despite years of progress monitoring
(Donaldson, 2009).
Although instructional practice evaluations have been in place for decades, there
has been little evidence to support that evaluations conducted by principals reliably
identify ineffective teachers with respect to student achievement outcomes (Weisberg et
al., 2009). Moreover, there has been even less evidence to suggest that the instructional
practice framework evaluation models used by school districts was being used with
fidelity to make human resource personnel decisions and provide responsive and candid
feedback to improve teaching and increase capacity for building human capital. Though
there has been little public disagreement that ineffective teachers should not remain in the
classroom, few have agreed as to how administrators should identify ineffective teachers
for remediation and dismissal (Winters & Cowen, 2013).
29

This chapter presents the rationale for conducting further research on the use of
Florida VAM scores for personnel decisions as correlated to local instructional practice
scores. The review of literature has been organized around (a) understanding the context
of teacher evaluation in the current era of reform; (b) an explanation of the observed Lake
Wobegon Effect in prior studies conducted throughout the United States; (c) the barriers
of candid teacher evaluation, including three key dimensions of individual conflict
avoidance, bureaucratic procedural interferences, and administrative procedural faults;
and (d) a summary of prior research related to the present study.
Multiple sources were used to search the literature. These included ERIC,
ProQuest, prior dissertations and theses, Internet sources, and references including
journals, periodicals, books, published reports, and the Florida Statutes.
Understanding the Context of Teacher Evaluation in the Current Era of Reform
According to the National Council on Teacher Quality, only four states required
teacher evaluations in 2009, and no states used evaluations to make tenure or dismissal
determinations (DeNisco, 2014). Traditionally, teacher evaluations systems relied solely
on principal observations of instructional practice and did a poor job at defining the most
effective, least effective, and middle-range teachers (Weisberg et al., 2009). There has
been little evidence supporting historical evaluation systems as a solid link between
teacher evaluation and student achievement (Steinberg & Donaldson, 2014). After the
passage of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) and Race to the Top (RTTT), all 50 states
updated evaluation policies and statutes so as to increase the use of student achievement
outcomes in teacher evaluation practices such as VAM scores (Hazi & Arredono
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Rucinski, 2009; Steinberg & Donaldson, 2014). According to Steinberg and Donaldson
(2014), states with new evaluation systems have required, on average, approximately two
formal observations and two informal observations for both beginning and veteran
teachers. In most cases, a formal observation was about 30 minutes in length, and
observers gathered and recorded evidence of a teacher’s instructional practice guided by
an observation rubric (Steinberg & Donaldson, 2014). A formative evaluation typically
ranged from 15 minutes to a short walkthrough where data collection and associated
feedback were not always required (Steinberg & Donaldson, 2014). However, the
frequency and intensity of an evaluation has often varied according to a teacher’s contract
status. A veteran teacher with a professional service contract or continuing contract
(often known and referred to as tenured) typically has been evaluated less frequently and
intensely, if at all (Donaldson, 2009).
The reasoning for major teacher evaluation reform is twofold: first, to use solid
methods of teacher assessment to increase teacher instructional skills via professional
development, coaching, and training, and, second, to aid in high-stakes personnel
decisions such as non-reappointment, termination, decision to award merit pay, and
removal from tenure status (Steinberg & Donaldson, 2014). In the state of Florida, at the
time of the present study, teacher evaluation in accordance with Florida Statute
§1012.34(3)(4) was comprised of at least one-third student achievement outcomes as
measured by a VAM, at least one-third local instructional practice evaluation scores, and
the remaining one-third of other indicators of performance. These indicators were
outlined by professional and job responsibilities as recommended by the State Board of
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Education or identified by the district school board, peer reviews, objectively reliable
survey information from students and parents based on teaching practices that are
consistently associated with higher student achievement, and other valid and reliable
measures of instructional practice.
These statutory changes occurred in the wakes of NCLB and RTTT, in addition to
a call by the National Governors Association (NGA) to target teacher evaluation as a
means to increase student achievement via a highly qualified teacher in every classroom
(Hazi & Arredondo Rucinski, 2009). Among the policy goals proposed by the NGA for
improving student learning, Florida specifically implemented required annual teacher
evaluations and a focused approach on improving teaching practice through peer review
and portfolios. Broadening evaluation participation to include teachers, administrators,
and parents, using a state-approved teacher evaluation system with an increased focus on
student progress (learning gains), and the use of teacher peers when conducting
evaluations were also included in proposed system revisions (Hazi & Arredondo
Rucinski, 2009).
The Lake Wobegon Effect
The Lake Wobegon Effect is a term characterized by “a phenomenon in which
most individuals or groups perform above average” (Wheeler & Haertel, 1993, p. 82).
Within the educational realm, the Lake Wobegon Effect was first used in a survey report
proposed by Cannell in 1987 where in all 50 states, 90% of school districts reported that
students tested above average despite evidence of poor literacy and graduation rates
(Wheeler & Haertel, 1993). Wheeler and Haertel cited that the reasoning for the
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manifestation of the Lake Wobegon Effect in Cannell’s study was due to “…dated norms,
use of nonsecure tests, selection of curricula and programs that are closely aligned to the
tests, teaching to the tests, inappropriate test administration and scoring procedures, and
selection of those individuals to be tested” (p. 82). In the case of local teacher
instructional practice scores, the Lake Wobegon Effect is realized when most teachers are
deemed effective or highly effective despite contradictory evidence displayed by low
student achievement measures (Tucker, 1997). Three key dimensions have surfaced from
the literature as contributors to the Lake Wobegon Effect on inflated performance
evaluations: individual conflict avoidance, bureaucratic procedural interferences, and
administrative procedural faults. These three dimensions encompass barriers to
meaningful evaluative practice such as… “poor evaluation instruments, limited district
guidance, lack of evaluator time, lack or evaluator skill, lack of evaluator will, absence of
high-quality feedback for teachers, and few consequences attached to evaluation”
(Donaldson, 2010, p. 55).
An illustration of the Lake Wobegon Effect in teacher evaluation practice was
documented in 2001 when Patricia Hopkins became the superintendent of two school
districts in Maine. According to Hopkins, when conducting a review of the summative
evaluations of all teachers in the two districts, the performance reviews were more akin to
valentines than evaluations; the summative ratings were full of vague, meaningless
praise, and overall, were absent of constructive criticism and actionable feedback
(Donaldson, 2010). In a study of 15,176 teachers across 12 districts, 74% of teachers
surveyed reported that they had not received specific feedback in their evaluations on
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how to improve instructional practice (Weisberg et al., 2009). Moreover, in the same
study, half the districts surveyed did not dismiss a single non-probationary teacher within
a five-year span; more than 99% of teachers receiving a satisfactory rating on a binary
scale; and 94% of teachers received one of the top two ratings on a multi-tiered scale
(Weisberg et al., 2009). In the same year, Donaldson (2009) cited a Chicago study in
which 56% of veteran principals conceded that they assigned teachers a higher evaluation
rating than their evaluation warranted. She also noted that although it is possible that all
teachers are effective in some schools, it is more likely that variation in teacher
effectiveness exists within schools than between them.
According to Weisberg et al. (2009), not only do school districts fail to
acknowledge differences between teachers in terms of teacher performance and student
outcomes, but most teachers’ evaluations appear to be highly inflated and skewed at the
top of the rating scale: over 60% of teachers received the highest rating, 10% received a
middle rating, and only 2% received the lowest rating possible. Even with a stateprescribed instrument for principal evaluation of teacher performance, there is no
guarantee of a more stratified distribution of performance scores; Langlois & Colarusso
(1988) found that 98.2% of teachers received a perfect evaluation score when districts
used the Pennsylvania State Education Department’s standard rating form to assess
teacher performance. Mela (2013) found within a population of 1,138 teachers in
Brevard County, Florida, 99% were rated effective or highly effective (p. 138). More
recently, Pace (2015), in a similar Brevard County study, found that administrators rated
92.5% of all teachers as highly effective or effective on the professional practices portion
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of the state-approved teacher evaluation instrument. These instances displayed a
continued failure of school administrators to use evaluation ratings and observation
results to accurately distinguish between levels of teacher performance despite increased
evaluator training initiatives. Furthermore, these findings have not been confined to
individual states: Tucker (2001) estimated the average number of incompetent teachers to
be between 5% and 15% overall. In like manner, a random sample of principals
nationwide determined that only 46% of all principals gave their school an excellent
rating:
Thus, any school--low- performing or high-performing, wealthy suburban or
under-resourced urban--is more likely to employ more under-performing teachers
than its evaluations ratings suggest. In fact, principals and teachers believe that
teachers are less effective than evaluations ratings would indicate. (Donaldson,
2009, p. 2)

The Case for Using Value-Added Modeling to Rate Teacher Performance
It has been established that individual teachers are the most important schoolrelated factor in student achievement and growth, but differences in teacher effectiveness
are not well predicted by historical evaluation practices and measures (Daley & Kim,
2010, p. 1). Differences between teacher effectiveness provide the best available
explanation for differences in achievement and growth between students once student
background is controlled for using VAM analysis (Daley & Kim, 2010). Moreover,
although it has been established that principals can accurately identify the best and worst
teachers in a school, VAM estimates of teacher effectiveness have been found to
generally better predict future student achievement than have principal ratings,
particularly when conducting evaluations of the broad middle-range of teachers in terms
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of effectiveness (Jacob & Lefgren, 2008). When considering local district evaluations as
compared to VAM scores, a scan of prior research provided evidence of low to moderate
correlations (Donaldson, 2009). In Cincinnati, Ohio, combined VAM estimates and
teacher evaluation scores for a sample of teachers in Grades 3-8 correlated at .43 for
mathematics, .32 for reading, and .27 for science, p < .001 (Milanowski, 2004).
Additionally, in a study of a Los Angeles, California elementary charter school,
Gallagher (2004) indicated a strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship
between teacher evaluation scores and student achievement using VAM teacher effects
correlated with teacher evaluation scores in reading (.50 correlation, p = .01). Papay
(2011) found correlations within a large Northeastern United States school district that
ranged from .15 to .58 when correlating VAM scores with various state standardized
assessments for mathematics, reading, and English-language arts, as well as the Stanford
Achievement Test (SAT) subtests for reading and mathematics. Specifically, in Florida,
Mela (2013) correlated each of the eight components of the School Board of Brevard
County Instructional Personnel Performance Appraisal System Instrument to individual
teacher VAM scores, and found weak to moderate positive relationships spanning
between .089 and .231, p < .05.
The Lake Wobegon Effect manifested through teacher instructional practice
scores has serious and lasting ramifications on student progress and achievement over
time. Although the instability of VAM scores of teacher effectiveness has been
acknowledged in the literature, there are data that provide for validity in practice when
multiple assessments and years of teacher performance have been considered (Papay,
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2011; Winters & Cowen, 2013). For example, Winters and Cowen, in their 2013 study in
Florida), found that students assigned to teachers who one or two years earlier would
have been dismissed according to a VAM-based policy of ineffective teacher dismissal
made considerably smaller academic improvements than did students assigned to
effective teachers denoted by VAM measures. More specifically, these data provided
evidence that students assigned to teachers at or below the fifth percentile with
consecutive years of ineffective VAM score indicators yielded an average 0.188 standard
deviation decrease in student achievement one year later compared to students with
teachers who were above the fifth percentile according to VAM measures (Winters &
Cowen, 2013).
Barriers to Candid Teacher Evaluation Practices
School administrators face many challenges that typically work against their
decision to recommend contract non-renewal for teachers (Nixon, Packard, & Dam,
2011). Among these barriers are individual conflict avoidance, bureaucratic procedural
interferences, and administrative procedural faults, embedded within the competing
nomothetic and idiographic dimensions of the social systems theory of administrative
behavior (Getzels & Guba, 1957). Getzels & Guba posed this theory in terms of the
following equation: B = f (R x P), where B represents behavior observed, R represents
the given institutional role defined by expectations (the nomothetic dimension), and P
represents the personality of the particular role incumbent (idiographic dimension).
According to this formula, school administrators are viewed to be straddling individual
and institutional conflict of roles and expectations (supervision, evaluation, and feedback
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toward the goal) versus their own personality and needs (harmony and belongingness)
(Getzels & Guba, 1957). School administrators must achieve a balance of both their roles
and personality dimensions to exhibit behavior conducive to achievement of the
institutional goal. It is important to note that individual conflict avoidance, bureaucratic
procedural interferences, and administrative procedural faults all contribute to the same
equation, are interconnected in nature, and often overlap in professional practice.

Individual Conflict Avoidance
Individual conflict avoidance is defined as an administrative personality flaw or
lack of will to achieve the educational goal that causes an aversion to conflict and
discomfort when conducting face-to-face performance critiques. Getzels and Guba
(1957) referred to this as role-personality conflict. Individual conflict avoidance occurs
when administrators believe they must choose between nomothetic expectations and
fulfillment of individual needs, creating a lopsided equation between the administrative
role and personality domains B = F (r x P) or B = f (R x p) (Getzels & Guba, 1957).
When administrators favor the nomothetic, B = (R x p), they behave in a way that is
entirely role-oriented in the pursuit of the institution goal while simultaneously ignoring
the personal integration aspect of administration and leadership. In contrast, if
administrators choose to maximize the personality aspect of the equation, B = (r x P),
they become unable to perform the role expectations due to an acute awareness of the
“flesh-and-blood” needs of those within the organization (Getzels & Guba, 1957).
Evaluation systems that reflect both the accountability and the personal growth
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dimensions are critical to the balancing of individual and institutional goals within an
educational leader (Stronge, 1995). Hain and Smith (1966) stated:
Every principal holds in his hands the career of a significant number of teachers.
Hopefully, principals exercise wise judgments and view their role as one helping
their teachers do a better job with students. (p. 1)
Although these words date back to the mid-1960s, the notion of principal as caregiver to
his or her teachers still rings true today. Principals have a role to fulfill in increasing
student achievement, but they also have a role in the human capital development of staff,
including non-retention of staff members who are not fulfilling their responsibility
toward reaching the institutional goal:
As educational leaders, principals are held responsible for not only the
educational quality at the building level but the morale and general welfare of all
those who work and study in their buildings. They must be able to verbalize their
vision of ethically responsible conduct and demonstrate through their actions that
they take seriously the moral obligations that come with the position no matter
how onerous the task. (Pratt, 1996, p. 30)
When faced with difficult decisions such as non-retention of an underperforming
teacher, the educational leader must come to a morally defensible decision that balances
the demand of the institutional goal against the competing demands of protecting
students, teachers, and the organization (Pratt, 1996). This can be an extremely lonely
time for a principal, creating an uncomfortable divide between the leadership and the
subordinates within the school (Randklev & Lemon, 1990). A major contributor in the
dismissal of incompetent teachers is the personal stress a principal may endure during the
process: “The psychological consequences of threatening another human being’s selfworth becomes a critical issue for principals when they are face-to-face with teachers
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who are not performing satisfactorily” (Mock & Melnick, 1991, p. 6). Additionally,
administrators may experience difficulty with confrontation and hostility, stemming from
the personality-role conflict of first offering assistance, and rendering the necessary final
judgment on performance (Tucker, 1997). In situations where principals must decide on
whether to recommend or non-retain a teacher, they must deal with their own underlying
personal issues such as disillusionment, distrust, stress, and fear of failure, combined with
the multiple roles they hold within the organization while considering how to act and be
perceived in their roles as educational leaders (Pratt, 1996; Stronge, 1995). Phillips and
Young (1997) surmised that educational leaders take on a role in an organization as the
keeper of justice and caring, simultaneously balancing an attitude of caring and justice for
students with caring and justice for individual teachers whom they regard as incapable of
meeting students’ educational needs. In an interview, a superintendent stated that the role
of an educational leader must be to grow human capital at any cost:
Well, I guess the one thing that a good teacher really can’t afford to do is to give
up on any students…I would take that analogy and apply it to what we are doing
with teachers…that those who are on the team were good enough to make it. And
if they’re not playing as well as you want them to be, or they’re affecting the
performance of the team, then you’ve got to do all you can to help them. (Phillips
& Young, 1997, p. 112)
The superintendent continued:
Well, how many chances do you give a person? That’s a difficult one… it may
mean that we are going to have to be in that pattern of working with that person
on an on-going basis, and we may have to accept that. (Phillips & Young, 1997, p.
112)
However, the means of action for an educational leader in the current era of reform
simply cannot be to accept that a teacher is underperforming and enter into a holding
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pattern of assistance. President Obama recently spoke about improving teacher
evaluation in instances of teacher performance issues stating:
If a teacher is given a chance or two chances or three chances but still does not
improve, there is no excuse for that person to continue teaching. I reject a system
that rewards failure and protects a person from its consequences. The stakes are
too high. We can afford nothing but the best when it comes to our children’s
teachers and the schools where they teach. (Weisberg et al., 2009, p. 2)
However, dismissal of incompetent teachers can be surmised as a problem
inherent within the culture of school organizations, where teachers expect to be rated
effective or highly effective (Weisberg et al., 2009). The discomfort associated with
confronting ineffective teachers, particularly when there has been a long history of
evaluative predecessors who had avoided confronting poor performance in the past, can
be daunting for an educational leader (Phillips & Young, 1997). If educational leaders
tend to imbalance the role and personality dimensions in favor of individual conflict
avoidance, the ramifications can have lasting negative effects when nearly all teachers are
rated good or great (Weisberg et al., 2009). In a 2009 New Teacher Project report, a
Chicago public school teacher revealed, “Many teachers are accustomed to receiving a
‘superior’ rating and simply do not accept anything lower. It also seems to be an easier
way out for administrators, rather than have a confrontation with the teacher” (Weisberg
et al., 2009). In another study, an educational supervisor was interviewed, revealing how
some predecessors had responded to a nonperforming teacher in favor of individual
conflict avoidance:
They had, in fact protected this teacher over the years--the school and the school
district- in not giving this particular teacher [courses for which there were
province-wide examination] so that there wasn’t a check on achievement and that
kind of thing…. Why wasn’t this addressed in the first 20 years of this man’s
41

career? It’s just sad that he was allowed to carry on…. Here’s a man who taught
in this district for 20 years. And if he wasn’t provided with assistance to the job
that we wanted to be done- there’s some responsibility on our part- over 20 years.
There is something wrong with what we have been doing as a district…. Kids
were dropping out of his classes, no one ever told him why…the parents…would
phone the principal. Things were changed quietly. I think no one was every upfront with the guy. It’s not fair. (Phillips & Young, 1997, p. 113)
Other means of individual conflict avoidance on behalf of educational
administrators is transferring an underperforming teacher to another school to avoid
facing a difficult decision where there are no completely satisfactory solutions (Bridges,
1985). Some administrators may move underperforming teachers to another school in the
hope that a change in environment and a fresh start may spark improvements in the
teacher’s performance, though little evidence exists to suggest this is a solution to the
overarching problem (Fuhr, 1993). This practice is referred to within the education
community as “the dance of the lemons…pass the turkey” (Bridges, 1985, p. 21). Fuhr
(1993) criticized this practice, stating that it was “…simply the coward’s way out.
Remember that whatever we do must be based on what is best for our students.
Therefore, marginal performance in School A usually will mean marginal performance in
School B” (p. 28).
Working with an underperforming teacher requires discipline and commitment on
the part of an educational leader. This includes explicitly articulating to a teacher the
area that needs improvement, interpreting concerns and expectations, gathering data on
how to assist deficiencies, helping the teacher make the needed improvement outlined
within a strategic plan, and setting a timeline for expected improvement within the
confines of the plan (Randklev & Lemon, 1990). “You must hope for improvement,
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expect improvement, and work for improvement” (Randklev & Lemon, 1990, p. 44).
Good teachers respect administrators who are not afraid to confront and correct poor
performance (Fuhr, 1993). To the contrary, if management fails to make the required
decisions to eliminate poor performance and reward truly exceptional teachers, overall
teacher performance and morale will decline (Fuhr, 1993).

Bureaucratic Procedural Interferences
Bureaucratic procedural interferences occur when state and local district policies
and personnel do not fully support school-based administrative actions and decisions
intended to tackle ineffective performance. Contributing factors to bureaucratic
procedural interferences are: poor evaluation instruments, limited district guidance, lack
of evaluator time, and few consequences attached to evaluations (Donaldson, 2010).
Getzels and Guba (1957) referred to this as role conflict, because it exclusively impacts
the role factor (R) in the equation B = f (R X P). Role conflict becomes apparent when
there is disagreement among several power-rendering groups that each has the right to
define the expectations for the same role though they represent contradictions in the
expectations of two or more roles held by the same administrator (Getzels & Guba,
1957). For a school-based administrator, these groups may be the superintendent, the
school board, or the teachers’ union. Each of these groups not only has the right to define
the role of the administrator, but each group typically holds enormously different
expectations for the same role (Getzels & Guba, 1957, 432).
Langlois and Colarusso (1988) stated that these competing demands for defining
the role of the principal can dramatically alter how evaluation practice is carried out.
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Furthermore, drastic change is necessary on behalf of education organizations to focus
more time on prioritizing, developing, and recognizing human capital through solid
administrative supervisory practices:
This kind of change requires courage--any big change does--and it requires
rethinking the way school executives spend their time. But how are we to pursue
this ideal amid the realities of the frantic busyness of the central office, the
demands of superiors, the ire of parents, the bravado of students, the complaints
(or worse yet, the complacency) of teachers, and the grumbling of unions? The
loudest cry is, of course, about the principal’s lack of time. (Langlois &
Colarusso, 1988, pp. 13-14)
In addition to time constraints within the role, principals are acutely aware of the
political context within educational organizations and feel pressure from multiple powerrendering parties that might affect decisions to dismiss ineffective teachers. Teacher
supervision, development, and evaluation have reinforced the top-down nature of school
governance (Cooper, Ehrensal, & Bromme, 2005). For example, in New York City,
regulations of the Department of Education combined with contract obligations from the
United Federation of Teachers have limited the Department’s power to review and
remove teachers (Cooper et al., 2005). The bureaucratic policies and procedures have
translated to limited actions to be taken by school principals due to elaborate processes
and third-party interventions. Furthermore, union representatives are specially trained in
the grievance process. As a result, principals who believe they have a strong case against
an incompetent teacher become disillusioned when the arbitrator cites technical errors
and the case is dismissed:
For example, if the principal wishes to give a teacher a negative performance
evaluation, he or she must write a letter that conforms in format to past arbitration
decisions. An incorrectly written letter will be removed from the teacher’s
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personnel file and will not be used as future evidence of poor teacher
performance. (Cooper et al., 2005, p.118)
When making the decision to dismiss an incompetent teacher, Brieschke (1986)
found that most principals cited that they tried to avoid involving themselves in the
lengthy, time-consuming, complicated, tension-producing procedures because the process
often did not end in the desired result. One principal stated:
The procedure is ridiculous. You just can’t keep up with all the fine points. If a
teacher is unsatisfactory on the 50th day she’s going to be unsatisfactory on the
51st day, or the 55th or 60th. It’s a tremendously involved situation and many
times you’re not successful. I just don’t bother with it anymore. (Brieschke,
1986, p. 244)

However, because local school boards and districts, not individual schools, enter
into legal contracts with teachers, the district controls the hiring, transferring, and
dismissal processes (National Council on Teacher Quality, 2010). Since the
implementation of RTTT, districts have largely made a concerted effort to improve
evaluation processes. Nevertheless, even in districts and states that require annual
evaluations, districts lack systems capable of recording evaluations electronically,
rendering the district unable to monitor teacher progress as noted by evaluators (National
Council on Teacher Quality, 2010). It has been reported in a study spanning school
districts in the states of Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, and Ohio that only one in 12
districts studied centrally tracked or recorded any evaluation data (Weisberg et al., 2009).
Other times, district processes allow for incompetent teachers to circumvent the dismissal
process by taking a leave of absence or some other measure (Brieschke, 1986). One
principal noted:
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I had one teacher who did everything to try and wiggle out of being E-2’d. She
just dropped out--didn’t show up, totally tried to confuse me with the days. Of
course, she was nowhere to be found on the 50th or 51st days (when the E-2 letter
had to be delivered). But I just kept counting and watching the days, and I finally
got her. (Brieschke, 1986)
Moreover, teacher seniority, rather than teacher performance, has been a longaccepted means of deciding which teachers to dismiss when student enrollment declines
in school districts (National Council on Teacher Quality, 2010). In a study conducted by
the National Council on Teacher Quality (2010), only six of the 76 districts surveyed
explicitly allowed for performance to be a factor in excessing decisions. Among the
districts in Florida within the study, Broward County allowed exceptions to this rule only
for teachers with extracurricular positions, those who were union representatives, and
those who were resource teachers, counselors, librarians, and reading teachers (National
Council on Teacher Quality, 2010). Dade County made exceptions for union
representatives, bilingual teachers, gifted and talented/international
baccalaureate/advanced placement teachers, and teachers with special training or unique
skills (National Council on Teacher Quality, 2010). Duval County made exceptions for
union teachers with extracurricular positions, union representatives, bilingual teachers,
and teachers with special training and or unique skills (National Council on Teacher
Quality, 2010). Finally, Palm Beach County made exceptions only for teachers with
extracurricular positions (National Council on Teacher Quality, 2010). This bureaucratic
means of decision-making means that new teachers are always the first to be dismissed,
no matter how effective they are (National Council on Teacher Quality, 2010). Therefore,
this practice leaves principals with little discretion as to who teaches in their buildings. It
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also inequitably distributes underperforming staff members to schools that primarily
serve poor and minority student populations (National Council on Teacher Quality,
2010).
Though school districts may be to blame for producing a bureaucratic system that
does not include student performance measures for personnel decisions, state laws also
contribute to the problem. The landmark education reform case, Vergara v. California
recently challenged and struck down both tenure laws and last-in-first-out (LIFO)
policies within the state (Davis, 2015; Robertson, 2015). The outcome of the case lent
momentum to efforts across the country in favor of using student performance to measure
quality teaching and eliminating seniority as a primary criterion for making personnel
decisions (Davis, 2015). The plaintiffs argued that existing teacher job-protection laws
caused a disproportionately high number of ineffective teachers to be placed in poor and
minority schools, essentially violating the equal protection clause of the California
Constitution with regard to students’ fundamental rights to education (Davis, 2015).
Furthermore, Futernick (2010) surmised that both educators and policy-makers
must better understand the challenge to administrative personnel regarding the problem
of unaddressed, underperforming teachers. According to both Futernick and Elmore
(2002), accountability tends to move in one direction: people with less authority are
accountable to those with more. Accountable communities are those in which members
have moved beyond simply working well together; they take responsibility for
monitoring the community’s own actions and for calling others on behaviors and stances
that are not helpful to the mission (Platt & Tripp, 2008). When those at the bottom of the
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authority hierarchy are squeezed by competing role definitions and “noise” from multiple
stakeholders, they are unable to adequately fill any role expectation (Futernick, 2010).
To better improve the evaluation system, Elmore (2002) and Futernick (2010) suggested
implementing policies of reciprocal accountability, where people with authority would
not just monitor performance and impose sanctions, but be responsible for ensuring that
those being monitored have the tools and backing they need to succeed.

Administrative Procedural Faults
Administrative procedural faults account for when administrators do not
accurately document teacher instructional practice with fidelity. Although individual
conflict avoidance is due to lack of administrator will, administrative procedural faults
are due to lack of administrator skill in evaluation combined with the absence in delivery
of high-quality feedback (Donaldson, 2010). Moreover, Weisberg et al. (2009) asserted
that the problem with teacher evaluation is not only with regard to underperforming
teacher feedback and dismissal, but also with administrators not formally identifying
those teachers who are truly exceptional:
In a world where all teachers are rated good or great, the truly outstanding
teachers--those who are realizing life-changing academic success for their
students--cannot be formally identified. And if they are not formally identified,
schools cannot prioritize their retention or leverage them to develop and improve
their colleagues. (p. 13)
Brieschke (1986) referred to this lack of skill as “educational mistakes” (p. 238)
which are hallmarked by errors in action, judgment, perception, or impression as to what
is required in the school situation to achieve intended goals. Getzels and Guba (1957)
referred to these faults as personality conflicts that detach the individual from the
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institutional purpose and goal, leaving the person “… to work out personal and private
needs and dispositions, however inappropriate these may be to the goals of the social
system as a whole” (p. 432). Personality conflict deals exclusively with the personality
factor (P) in the equation B = f (R x P) (Getzels & Guba, 1957). This leads to
incongruence between the nomothetic and idiographic dimensions; the two ends simply
do not meet, leading to administrative failure and a loss in institutional productivity
(Getzels & Guba, 1957). When school administrators exhibit personality conflicts, they
cannot reconcile their own needs as persons with the roles they are expected to perform.
Administrators may see no reason for the expectation placed upon them to supervise,
evaluate, and deliver high-quality feedback to teachers due to their lack of skill in the
evaluative process.
A revelation of administrative procedural faults was discovered by Range et al.
(2012) in a study conducted to explore differences between principals’ and
superintendents’ perceptions about teacher incompetency, strategies most frequently
implemented when working with incompetent teachers, and barriers to dismissing
incompetent teachers. Most concerning were the differences observed within a Likertscale survey (1 = no strength, 4 = high strength) that compared discrepancies between
principals’ and superintendents’ views of barriers to dismissing incompetent teachers
(Range et al., 2012). Principals rated required administrative time (M = 2.86), protection
of employee by professional association (M = 2.79), and legal and other expenses (M =
2.71) as barriers with strength when attempting to dismiss incompetent teachers (Range
et al., 2012). On the other hand, superintendents rated unclear definition of incompetence
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(M = 2.60), protection of employee by professional association (M = 2.57), and lack of
strength of character by the principal (M = 2.53) as the strongest barriers to dismissing
incompetent teachers (Range et al., 2012). The data provided a glimpse of the differing
perceptions of principals as opposed to superintendents when viewing issues related to
dismissing incompetent teachers, but moreover, provided evidence that superintendents
agreed significantly more than principals (t = 2.11, p < .04) and that lack of strength of
character of the principal was a major barrier to dismissing incompetent teachers (Range
et al., 2012).
Although school administrators have most often cited tenure as a major barrier to
incompetent teacher dismissal, opponents of this view cite weakness in skill and
ineffective management on behalf of school-based administrators as the root cause of this
misconception. Finberg (as cited in Davis, 2015), a representative of the California
Teachers Association during the Vergara v. California case, surmised:
Statutes don’t assign teachers to a classroom…the statutes don’t say anything
about race or poverty. Districts assign teachers to various schools with various
populations…put stronger principals in those schools…put resources into those
schools…you won’t have that phenomenon. (p. 20)
Furthermore, Zirkel (2010) asserted that the use of tenure as an excuse to not terminate an
ineffective teacher was a self-perpetuating scapegoating process. Zirkel (2010)
conducted a comprehensive canvas of court decisions, finding that defendants prevailed
over plaintiff teachers by a greater than three-to-one ratio, with no significant difference
between teachers who were tenured and nontenured:
…contrary to the prevailing perception, teacher tenure doesn’t guarantee lifetime
employment. Legally, teacher tenure is no more than procedural due process,
which means that notice and hearing are needed to ensure fundamental fairness
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that a termination must be based on generally accepted reasons, such as
incompetency, insubordination, and immorality. If this level of procedural and
substantive protection for an individual teacher becomes top heavy, outweighing
the interests of students and the rest of the institutional enterprise, the problem
isn’t tenure, but the lack of will among various players in the tenure process,
including those who participated in making state law and collective bargaining.
(p. 76)
Moreover, Nettles and Herrington (2007) identified significant relationships in
prior literature between selected school leadership practices and student learning,
indicating that evidence exists to support the notion that principal behaviors produce a
direct relationship to student achievement (p. 724). Among the duties of a school
principal as an instructional leader, comprehensively evaluating staff and rendering highquality feedback are at the top of the list with other areas. These include: maintaining a
safe and orderly environment, development of mission and vision, including stakeholders
in school communities, monitoring school progress, initiating instructional focus, setting
high expectations for student performance, and developing appropriate professional
development (Nettles & Herrington, 2007). Ovando and Ramirez (2007) identified
common behaviors that principals exhibited in a selected sample of school leaders at
exemplary or recognized schools. Behaviors included were: setting clear expectations,
monitoring instruction by conducting walkthrough observations, and connecting staff
development to teacher performance evaluation. One principal stated:
Obviously, we do walkthroughs. And I’ll be the first one to tell you that we don’t
do enough of them. And- because you’re taping I’m going to tell you that it is my
formal opinion that walkthroughs is the difference between being a good campus
and a not very good campus. (Ovando & Ramirez, 2007, p. 98)
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Principal behavior and skill are certainly a factor when tackling incompetence.
When improvement efforts fail, principals are faced with the moral dilemma of facing a
problem head-on, or ignoring the problem and turning the other way (Blacklock, 2002).
Although performance management is seen as a vital component to managing an
effective school, it is commonly perceived as much too difficult and tends to be ignored
or sidelined by those who manage (Yariv & Coleman, 2005). However, if the school
runs a strict procedure of periodical evaluations that includes formative and summative
feedback, there is a better foundation to offer assistance or dismiss a teacher, if necessary
(Yariv & Coleman, 2005). It can be argued that administrators prefer to give teachers
critical feedback outside the formal evaluation process. However, the New Teacher
Project found that 47% of teachers reported not having a single informal conversation
with their administrators within the past year about improving their performance
(Weisberg et al., 2009). Findings by Yariv and Coleman indicated that school principals
must be better equipped with knowledge, managerial skills, and sources of assistance to
solve difficult personnel difficulties, such as confronting and intervening in instances of
staff underperformance. Additionally, Weisberg et al. proclaimed that administrators
must marry the institutional goal of increasing student achievement with the personal
aspects of differentiating between teacher performance via actionable feedback by
holding deep reverence for the teaching profession and evaluation process, stating:
“Improved evaluation will not only benefit students by driving the systematic
improvement and growth of their teachers, but teachers themselves, by at last treating
them as professionals, not parts” (p. 8).
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Summary
Although teachers have the greatest impact on student achievement, high-quality
administrators who exhibit exemplary leadership and management skills also have an
immense effect on student success with regard to making decisions about which teachers
are hired and allowed to maintain their positions in the classroom. Additionally, there
has been little historical evidence to support that evaluation systems, and the feedback
held therein, are used as effective tools to provide a solid link between teacher evaluation
and student achievement (Steinberg & Donaldson, 2014). This review of the literature
encompassed an understanding of the context of teacher evaluation in the current era of
reform, an explanation of the observed Lake Wobegon Effect in prior studies conducted
throughout the United States with respect to teacher evaluations, and three dimensions
that encompass the various barriers to candid teacher evaluation: (a) individual conflict
avoidance; (b) bureaucratic procedural interferences; and (c) administrative procedural
faults. Ineffective teachers remaining in the classroom has resulted, in part, from a
dysfunctional system and culture present within schools and school leadership. The
present study was conducted to discover if lack of leadership is a positive indicator of a
dysfunctional system that permits ineffective teachers to remain in the classroom. The
findings of prior researchers described in this review of literature were used to guide the
investigation.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Introduction
This chapter contains a presentation of the methods and procedures used to
conduct the study. Included is a restatement of the purpose as well as the research
questions that guided the study and the various instruments were used to measure both
quantitative and qualitative research methods used in this study. The methods and
procedures that were used in the collection of data and the analysis of the data are also
explained in detail.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to determine if grossly ineffective teachers,
according to Florida VAM scores, had related instructional practice evaluations that were
being used to determine placement on improvement plans. Additionally, this study
served to determine if there was a difference between professional service
contract/continuing contract (tenured) and annual contract/probationary contract
(nontenured) teacher instructional practice scores and assignment to improvement plans
for teachers with the lowest 10% of VAM scores in Central Florida school districts.
Finally, the levels of feedback held within the local district performance evaluations and
improvement plans were reviewed to search for evidence of administrative barriers
within the three dimensions of (a) individual conflict avoidance, (b) bureaucratic
procedural interferences, and (c) administrative procedural faults that exist and inhibit
administrative evaluators from providing candid and actionable teacher performance
evaluations relative to student achievement.
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Research Questions
The following research questions and hypotheses guided the investigation of this
study:
1. What relationship, if any, exists between the lowest 10% of teachers’ VAM
scores and instructional practice evaluation scores in Central Florida school
districts?
H01: There is no observed relationship between the lowest 10% of teachers’
VAM scores as correlated to local instructional practice scores within Central
Florida school districts.
2. What difference, if any, exists between professional service
contract/continuing contract (tenured) and annual contract/probationary
contract (nontenured) teachers’ instructional practice scores within Central
Florida school districts?
H02: There is no observed difference between professional service
contract/continuing contract (tenured) and annual contract/probationary
contract (nontenured) teachers’ instructional practice scores within Central
Florida school districts.
3. What percentage of professional service contract/continuing contract (tenured)
and annual contract/probationary contract (nontenured) teachers identified
with the 10% of lowest VAM scores in Central Florida school districts have
been placed on improvement plans?
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4. Does the feedback reflected in the instructional practice evaluations and
improvement plans target student achievement for teachers with the lowest
10% of VAM scores in Central Florida School districts?

Selection of Subjects and Population
Subjects of this study were teachers with the lowest 10% of VAM scores for the
2013-14 school year within the counties represented by the Central Florida Public School
Boards Coalition (CFPSBC). The included school districts in the CFPSBC were:
Brevard, Highlands, Hillsborough, Lake, Manatee, Marion, Orange, Osceola, Pasco,
Polk, Seminole, Sumter, and Volusia.
To determine the subjects to be selected for use in responding to Research
Questions 1-3 of this study, a list of VAM scores for the 2013-14 school year was
obtained from the Florida Department of Education. The VAM score data were limited
by exclusion of some teacher names. According to an information file held within the
documents delivered to the researcher, some individual teacher names were masked,
(e.g., for any teacher who is exempt from public record disclosure per Florida law). The
Florida Department of Education cited the following Florida Statutes for these
exemptions: §119.071 (2)(j), (4)(d), and (5)(i); §265.605; and §267.17. Due to some
teachers’ names being masked, the researcher excluded incomplete data cases to obtain a
numerical list of VAM scores from greatest to least. Next, the lowest 10% of VAM
scores were obtained from this numeric list and selected for further analysis. Finally, the
researcher organized the list by Florida school district and included only teachers from
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the 13 school districts within the CFPSBC. Table 1 describes the population of included
subjects for Research Questions 1-3. The data file yielded a total of 758 teachers who
were selected for personnel file data examination with varying frequencies and
percentages held within the data for each of the 13 counties represented.

Table 1
Characteristics of Study Population

Central Florida
County
Brevard
Highlands
Hillsborough
Lake
Manatee
Marion
Orange
Osceola
Pasco
Polk
Seminole
Sumter
Volusia
Total

District Size
by Student
Enrollment
71,234
12,199
203,432
41,789
46,703
42,107
187,092
58,203
68,103
97,957
64,846
8,281
61,237
963,183

District
Grade
B
C
B
C
C
C
B
C
C
C
A
B
C
N/A

Note. VAM = Value-added model.
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Frequency
of Teachers
within
Lowest 10%
of VAM
Scores
24
11
195
28
20
34
99
60
54
121
41
17
54
758

% of
Selected
Population
by Central
Florida
County
3.2
1.5
25.7
3.7
2.6
4.5
13.1
7.9
7.1
16.0
5.4
2.2
7.1
100.0

Instrumentation
Florida’s Value-Added Model (VAM)
Florida has used a value-added model (VAM) measurement to determine the
contribution of a teacher or school to student learning. The VAM measurement
determines the difference in student performance on a statewide assessment from one
year to the next, and accounts for other factors specific to student, classroom, and school
characteristics that impact the learning process. Florida uses VAM scores for teachers
who are coded as teaching a course that includes a statewide assessment. Therefore, the
participants in this study were only teachers who taught a course or grade level with an
associated statewide assessment in the 2013-14 school year.
The VAM score determines the difference between the predicted performance and
the actual performance of a student on a statewide assessment. Value-added model
scores can be negative, positive, or zero. A score of zero means that the students on a
specific teacher’s roster scored exactly as predicted. A negative score means that student
scores fell below the predicted score. Conversely, a positive score means that student
scores exceeded the expectation. For example, if a teacher received a VAM score of
negative 0.30, it would mean that on average, the teacher’s students scored 30% below
the state average growth for that grade and subject. Alternatively, if a teacher received a
VAM score of positive 0.30, it would mean that on average, the teacher’s students scored
30% above the state average growth for that grade and subject. Figure 1 graphically
details how Florida VAM scores are determined.
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Note. Reproduced with permission from “Florida’s value-added models (VAM)
frequently asked questions”, Florida Department of Education, 2015.
Figure 1. Florida Value-added Example of Score Determination
For the purpose of this study, VAM scores were delivered to the researcher in an
online database that reflected the values described in this section. Value-added scores
were then sorted from greatest to least, and the lowest 10% of VAM scores were
identified. Once the lowest 10% of VAM scores by teacher were determined, the
researcher selected for teachers only within the 13 Central Florida counties represented
by the CFPSBC, yielding a total of 758 subjects for the purpose of investigating Research
Questions 1-4, utilizing secondary de-identified data from publicly available databases
under Florida Statute §119.07.
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Florida Instructional Personnel Evaluation Requirements
Florida Statute §1012.34(3) designates evaluation procedures and criteria for
instructional personnel and administrators. According to the statute, instructional
personnel and administrator performance evaluations must be based upon the
performance of students assigned to their classrooms or schools. Additionally, a school
district’s performance evaluation system is not limited to basing unsatisfactory
performance of instructional personnel and school administrators solely upon student
performance, but may include other criteria to evaluate instructional personnel and school
administrators’ performance, or any combination of student performance and other
criteria (Florida Statute §1012.34 (3), 2015). Evaluation procedures must comply with
the following: at least one-third of the overall teacher performance evaluation must be
based upon data indicators of student performance via VAM scores. At least one-third
must be based on an instructional practice score decided by school-based evaluators, and
the final one-third may be compiled considering other indicators of performance such as
professional and job responsibilities recommended by the State Board of Education or
identified by the district school board, peer reviews, objectively reliable survey
information from students and parents based on teaching practices that are associated
with higher student achievement, and other valid and reliable measures of instructional
practice (Florida Statute §1012.34 (3), 2015).
According to Florida Statute §1012.34, performance evaluation system
requirements include an evaluation system that has been approved by the Florida
Department of Education for the purpose of increasing student academic performance by
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improving the quality of instructional, administrative, and supervisory services in the
public schools of the state (Florida Statute §1012.34 (1)(a), 2015). Additionally,
evaluation system requirements for instructional personnel and school administrators
must be designed to support effective instruction and student learning growth; and
performance evaluation results must be used when developing district and school-level
improvement plans (Florida Statute §1012.34 (2)(a), 2015). Furthermore, appropriate
instruments must be utilized, procedures must be in place, timely feedback must be
rendered with criteria for continuous quality improvement of the professional skills of
instructional personnel and school administrators. Performance evaluation results must
be used when identifying professional development (Florida Statute §1012.34 (2)(b),
2015). Moreover, Florida Statute §1012.34 (2)(e) states that performance evaluations
must differentiate among four levels of performance as follows: (1) highly effective, (2)
effective, (3) needs improvement or, for instructional personnel within the first three
years of employment who need improvement, developing, and (4) unsatisfactory. Each
of the 13 Central Florida school districts that were selected for this study have a stateapproved teacher evaluation system. To fulfill the statutory requirements, Lake, Orange,
Osceola, Pasco, and Seminole school districts have used the state model of teacher
evaluation based on the research and meta-analyses of Marzano. Highlands,
Hillsborough, Manatee, Marion, Sumter, and Volusia school districts have used the
Danielson model and may have adopted principles from the state model, including the
scoring system and deliberate practice plan. Finally, Brevard and Polk school districts
selected another state-approved model to fulfill the statutory requirements and may
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include indicators from the state model. Overall, all three instructional practice options
for state-approved teacher evaluation models differentiate between the four levels of
summative performance ratings as prescribed by Florida Statute §1012.34 (2)(e). For the
purpose of this study, and to respond to Research Question 1, evaluation ratings of (1)
highly effective, (2) effective, (3) needs improvement or developing, and (4)
unsatisfactory were used to determine if the instructional practice score related to the
matching VAM score for the selected subjects. Instructional practice scores for selected
subjects were obtained to determine if there was a statistically significant difference
between professional service contract/continuing contract (tenured) and annual
contract/probationary contract (nontenured) instructional practice quantitative ratings to
respond to Research Question 1. Additionally, whether or not an improvement plan was
included in the instructional practice evaluation for the selected subjects by tenured or
nontenured contract status was investigated to respond to Research Question 3. Finally,
the highest level of feedback within instructional practice evaluations and improvement
plans, as described by the rubric developed by Rafalski (2015), was used to respond to
Research Question 4.
Florida Instructional Personnel Contract Types
The Florida Department of Education has been governed by two statutes that
describe the different types of instructional personnel contracts that may be offered to
teachers. The first type of contract is a probationary contract which may be offered for a
period of one school year to instructional personnel upon initial employment in a school
district (Florida Statute §1012.335(1)(c), 2015). The second type of contract is defined as
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an annual contract which is the only contract that may be offered to instructional
personnel hired after July 1, 2011. An annual contract can be offered for a period of one
school year, and the district school board may choose to award or not to award without
cause (Florida Statute §1012.335(1), 2015. The third type of contract is a professional
service contract which was only offered to instructional personnel hired prior to July 1,
2011 and is renewed each year unless the district school superintendent, after receiving
recommendations required by Florida Statute §1012.34, charges the employee with
unsatisfactory performance. In this case, the superintendent notifies the employee of
performance deficiencies as required by the statute; the employee receives two
consecutive annual performance evaluation ratings of unsatisfactory within a three-year
period; or three consecutive performance evaluations of needs improvement or a
combination of needs improvement or unsatisfactory (Florida Statute §1012.33 (2)(c) &
Florida Statute §1012.33 (3)(a)(b), 2015). The fourth and final contract type, a
continuing contract, is less common. A continuing contract may be held by any
employee in the state of Florida who held continuing contract status prior to July 1, 1984
(Florida Statute §1012.33(4)(a), 2016). Any Florida teacher holding continuing contract
status prior to July 1, 1984 shall be entitled to retain such contract and all rights arising
from it as prescribed by the State Board of Education, unless the employee voluntarily
relinquishes his or her continuing contract (Florida Statute §1012.33(4)(a), 2016). Any
member of the district administrative or supervisory staff and any member of the
instructional staff, including the school principal, who is under continuing contract may
be suspended or dismissed at any time during the school year; however, the charges
63

against him or her must be based on immorality, misconduct in office, incompetency,
gross insubordination, willful neglect of duty, drunkenness or being convicted or found
guilty of, or enter a plea of guilty to, regardless of adjudication of guilt, any crime
involving moral turpitude, as these terms are defined by rule of the State Board of
Education (Florida Statute §1012.33(4)(c), 2016). All contracts are subject to the same
aforementioned annual performance evaluation requirements. To investigate Research
Questions 2 and 3, instructional personnel were divided by (a) professional
service/continuing contract status (tenured) and (b) annual contract/probationary contract
status (nontenured) to determine if there was a difference in how tenured and nontenured
teachers were rated by administrative personnel and assigned to improvement plans as
evidenced by instructional practice evaluations.
Levels of Feedback
Research Question 4 required a protocol and rubric to review the highest levels of
feedback provided for within the instructional practice evaluations and improvement
plans (if present) for each of the 758 subjects in this study. The following rubric and
accompanying definitions, developed by Rafalski (2015) in a prior study and used with
her permission, were used to gather data on feedback categories and levels.
Level 1 - No feedback: The observer provides no opinion in the comment section
of the protocol.
Level 2 - Unrelated feedback or general statement: The observer gives some
information in the comment section, but it is not relevant to the element or meaning
cannot be interpreted.
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Level 3 - Recount of observation events: This could include a narrative of what
the teacher and students were doing during the observation, general statements of events,
or notes the observer took to justify the rating given. In some instances, the observer
included statements to support the effectiveness of a strategy.
Level 4 - General affirmation or praise statement: The observer either leaves a
single word or phrase to indicate approval or adds a compliment to the end of a recount
of observation of events.
Level 5 - Reflective feedback: The observer asks the teacher to think about the
practice or a specific element in either a general or specific way.
Level 6 - Standardized feedback: The observer uses the cut and paste option in the
protocol to leave systematized feedback.
Level 7 - Specific targeted feedback: The observer leaves differentiated and
meaningful statements intended to improve the impact of an instructional strategy.

Data Collection
Prior to initiating data collection, the proposal for the study was examined by
University of Central Florida Institutional Review Board (IRB), and it was determined
that the study did not include human research (Appendix A). Thus, University of Central
Florida IRB review and approval were not required as all data collected were deidentified, and secondary information was obtained from publically available databases.
Value-added model scores were obtained from the Florida Department of Education
(FDOE) through the Division of Accountability, Research, and Measurement via a public
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record request made directly to the FDOE. Instructional practice scores, teacher
improvement plans, and evaluation feedback were obtained through the district offices of
each respective school district, by submitting formal public record requests (Appendix B)
to each individual district office pursuant to Florida Statute §119.07.
Data Analysis
This study was guided by an interest in determining if grossly ineffective
teachers, according to Florida VAM scores, had related instructional practice evaluations
that were being used to determine placement on improvement plans. Additionally, this
study served to determine if there was a difference between tenured and nontenured
teacher instructional practice scores for teachers with the lowest 10% of VAM scores in
13 Central Florida school districts. Finally, the highest levels of feedback held within the
local district performance evaluations and improvement plans were reviewed to search
for evidence of administrative barriers within the three dimensions of individual conflict
avoidance, bureaucratic procedural interferences, and administrative procedural faults
that exist and inhibit administrative evaluators from providing candid teacher
performance evaluations relative to student achievement. The research questions and
hypotheses governed the selection of statistical measures and analytical procedures to be
used, as described in Table 2.
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Table 2
Research Questions, Research Methods, Variables, Data Sources, and Data Analysis

1.

Research Questions
What relationship, if any, exists
between the lowest 10% of teachers’
VAM scores and instructional
practice evaluation scores in Central
Florida school districts?

Research
Methods
Quantitative

Variables
VAM scores and
instructional
practice scores

Data Sources
Analysis
VAM scores and
Pearson r Correlation
instructional practice
scores

2.

What difference, if any, exists
between PSC/CC and AC/PC
teachers’ instructional practice scores
within Central Florida school
districts?

Quantitative

Instructional
Instructional
practice scores and practice scores
teacher contract
statuses

Independent samples t
test, Cohen’s d

3.

What percentage of PSC/CC and
AC/PC teachers identified within the
10% of lowest VAM scores in
Central Florida school districts have
been placed on improvement plans?

Quantitative

Instructional
practice evaluation
content. Y/N
contains
improvement plan

Instructional
practice evaluations

Descriptive statistics,
frequencies and
percentage of teachers
assigned improvement
plans by contract status
and total population

4.

Does the feedback reflected in the
instructional practice evaluations and
improvement plans target student
achievement for teachers with the
lowest 10% of VAM scores in
Central Florida school districts?

Qualitative

Feedback levels

Feedback content
from instructional
practice evaluations

Descriptive statistics,
including a frequency
distribution of feedback
rubric ratings to
illustrate findings

67

Quantitative data for instructional practice and student achievement (VAM
scores) were collected, analyzed, and reported for a correlational analysis. The mean and
standard deviation of the instructional practice scores for the subjects were compared
using an independent samples t-test to determine whether there was a significant
difference between professional service contract/continuing contract (tenured) and annual
contract/probationary contract (nontenured) teachers’ scores within the lowest 10% of
VAM scores in the represented school districts within the study. Frequencies and
percentages were used to determine the number of teachers within the population of
subjects selected who were placed on improvement plans by contract status (tenured or
nontenured). Finally, descriptive statistics including a frequency distribution, range,
mean, and standard deviation were used to provide a quantitative measure of the highest
levels of feedback provided within instructional practice evaluations. This was
accomplished using the method and instrument of data analysis developed by Rafalski
(2015) with her explicit permission. A sample of Rafalski’s rubric for feedback
determination rating is included in Appendix C.
Summary
In this chapter, the purpose of this study and the research questions were restated.
The selection of subjects, instrumentation, data collection procedures, and data analysis
processes were also discussed. The selection of subjects yielded 758 teachers from 13
Central Florida counties to provide data for investigation of the research questions.
Results of the data analysis are presented in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 4
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to determine if grossly ineffective teachers,
according to Florida VAM scores, had related instructional practice evaluations that were
used to determine placement on improvement plans. Additionally, this study served to
determine if there was a difference between professional service contract/continuing
contract (tenured) and annual contract/probationary contract (nontenured) teacher
instructional practice scores and assignment to improvement plans for teachers within the
lowest 10% of VAM scores in 13 Central Florida school districts. Finally, the levels of
feedback held within the local district performance evaluations and improvement plans
were reviewed to search for evidence of administrative barriers within the three
dimensions of individual conflict avoidance, bureaucratic procedural interferences, and
administrative procedural faults that exist and inhibit administrative evaluators from
providing candid and actionable teacher performance evaluations relative to student
achievement. This chapter presents the results of descriptive and inferential analyses for
the four stated research questions.
The descriptive statistics for the population investigated were first reported,
followed by the results of a Pearson r correlation employed to respond to Research
Question 1, an independent samples t-test used to respond to Research Question 2, and
descriptive statistics, frequencies, and percentages to respond to Research Questions 3
and 4. Finally, additional supporting analyses were reported for each school district
investigated using descriptive statistics. Narrative descriptions, as well as
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complementary tables and figures, were used in responding to each of the research
questions. A summary of key findings concludes Chapter 4.

Overall Descriptive Statistics
Upon completion of data collection, the total population for this study decreased
from 758 teachers in 13 school districts within Central Florida, to 528 teachers in 11
school districts within Central Florida, or 69.66% of the total population. Reasoning for
the elimination of 230 teachers was due to a variety of conditions, such as: (a) incomplete
personnel files held within school district central offices, yielding missing information for
selected subjects; (b) elimination of charter school employees due to charter school
personnel files not being held by school district central offices; (c) termination of
employees prior to completion of the 2013-14 school year summative instructional
practice evaluations; (d) retirement of employees prior to the completion of the 2013-14
school year summative instructional practice evaluations; and (e) duplicates of teacher
names within the original value-added model (VAM) score data from the Florida
Department of Education (FDOE) due to part-time employment at multiple schools.
Both Marion County and Lake County teachers were disregarded due to lack of contract
statuses shared by these school district central offices via public record request. The
overall frequencies for the population of subjects who were included in this study as
compared to the total population determined prior to data collection are illustrated in
Table 3.
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Table 3
Pre- and Post-Data Collection Frequencies of Study Teachers by County: 2013-14
Frequency of Teachers in Lowest 10% of VAM Scores 2013-14

Central Florida
County
Brevard
Highlands

Pre-data Collection
24

Post-data Collection
20

11

7

195

165

Lake

28

0

Manatee

20

8

Marion

34

0

Orange

99

80

Osceola

60

48

Pasco

54

46

Polk

121

63

Seminole

41

36

Sumter

17

17

Volusia

54

38

758

528

Hillsborough

Total

Research Question 1
What relationship, if any, exists between the lowest 10% of teachers’ VAM scores
and instructional practice evaluation scores in Central Florida school districts?
H01: There is no observed relationship between the lowest 10% of teachers’ VAM
scores as correlated to local instructional practice scores within Central Florida
school districts.
The Florida Department of Education provided VAM scores of all Florida
teachers that were numerically ordered from least to greatest to determine the teachers in
Central Florida school districts within the lowest 10% of VAM scores for the entire state
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for the 2013-14 school year. Instructional practice scores were obtained through public
records requests made to each Central Florida school district in accordance with Florida
Statute §119.07. A total of 528 teachers within the total population of 758 yielded
complete data sets for all investigations included in this study, or 69.66% of the total
population.
Value-added model scores ranged between -2.28 and -0.63, which were correlated
with instructional practice scores that ranged from one to four (1 = highly effective, 2 =
effective, 3 = needs improvement/developing, and 4 = unsatisfactory). Value-added
model scores displayed a mean of -0.90 and a standard deviation of 0.27. A histogram of
VAM score frequencies within the population (N = 528) illustrated negative skewness as
shown in Figure 2. Therefore, the greatest frequency of VAM scores were between -1.16
and -0.63, with some outliers as negative as -2.28.
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Figure 2. Histogram of Value-added Model (VAM) Score Frequencies Observed
Alternatively, instructional practice scores for the population displayed a mean of
1.65 (between highly effective and effective), and a standard deviation of 0.65 (N = 528).
Descriptive statistics provided the frequency of instructional practice scores observed. Of
the 528 summative instructional practice evaluations investigated, 43.2% of teachers
were rated highly effective, 51.1% of teachers were rated effective, 3.6% of teachers
were rated needs improvement/developing, and 2.1% of teachers were rated
unsatisfactory. Table 4 presents the frequencies and percentage of teachers in each
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instructional practice rating category. Additionally, a histogram of instructional practice
score frequencies within the population illustrates positive skewness as shown in Figure
3. Hence, the greatest frequency of teachers were rated (1) highly effective and (2)
effective, with few being rated (3) needs improvement/developing or (4) unsatisfactory.

Table 4
Frequencies and Percentage of Teachers by Instructional Practice Rating Category
Instructional Practice Rating
Highly Effective
Effective
Needs Improvement/Developing
Unsatisfactory
Total

f
228
270
19
11
528
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%
43.2
51.1
3.6
2.1
100.0

Figure 3. Histogram of Instructional Practice Score Frequencies Observed
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A Pearson r correlation was used to determine if a relationship existed between
the lowest 10% of teachers’ VAM scores and instructional practice evaluation scores in
Central Florida school districts. The result of this analysis produced a negative
correlation: r(526) = -.104, p = 0.016. The null hypothesis was rejected at the p < .05
level; a very weak relationship existed between the lowest 10% of teachers’ VAM scores
and instructional practice scores in Central Florida school districts in the 2013-14 school
year. However, the null hypothesis would be accepted at the p < .01 level, indicating no
relationship existed between these two variables. A negative correlation was observed
due to instructional practice scores being 1 = highly effective, 2 = effective, 3 = needs
improvement/developing, and 4 = unsatisfactory. Therefore, a lower instructional
practice numerical score designated a higher rating in terms of observed effectiveness by
an administrative evaluator. Consequently, a negative correlation indicated instructional
practice ratings were less favorable as correlated to increasingly negative VAM scores.
However, this relationship was observed to be very weak at the p < .05 level (rejecting
the null hypothesis), and no relationship was observed at the p < .01 level (accepting the
null hypothesis). This correlational analysis is presented in Table 5.

Table 5
Pearson Correlation Coefficients: VAM Scores and Instructional Practice Scores
Descriptor

Instructional Practice Scores

Value-added (VAM) scores

-0.104*

Note. *p = 0.016
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The significance of this correlation at the p < .05 level is likely due to a large
sample size with the result of the correlation unlikely to have arisen by chance. Figure 4
displays a scatterplot to support the Pearson r correlational findings, illustrating plots
oriented in a parallel fashion for each instructional practice score (1 = highly effective, 2
= effective, 3 = needs improvement/developing, and 4 = unsatisfactory), with a greater
distribution of parallel plots located above the (1) highly effective and (2) effective
categories on the x-axis, regardless of the VAM score rating spread. Consequently,
regardless of the relative negativity of any particular VAM score, administrative
evaluators rated teachers as (1) highly effective, and (2) effective most frequently on the
instructional practice portion of the overall summative teacher evaluation.
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Figure 4. Scatterplot of Value-added (VAM) Scores as Related to Instructional Practice
Scores
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Research Question 2
What difference, if any, exists between professional service contract/continuing
contract (tenured) and annual contract/probationary contract (nontenured)
teachers’ instructional practice scores within Central Florida school districts?
H0: There is no observed difference between professional service
contract/continuing contract (tenured) and annual contract/probationary contract
(nontenured) teachers’ instructional practice scores within Central Florida school
districts.
A total of 11 Central Florida school districts provided summative evaluation data
for the 2013-14 school year via public record requests in accordance with Florida Statute
§119.07 for 528 teachers within the total population included in this study. Contract
statuses of (a) professional service contract, (b) continuing contract, (c) annual contract,
and (d) probationary contract were observed throughout the population. For the purpose
of this study, professional service contract and continuing contract teachers were
considered to be tenured, whereas annual contract and probationary contract teachers
were considered to be nontenured. As shown in Table 6, of the total population of 528
teachers, 278 (52.7%) teacher evaluations examined were those of tenured teachers, and
the remaining 250 (47.3%) evaluations were those of nontenured teachers.

Table 6
Frequency and Percentage of Teachers by Contract Status
Contract Status
Tenured: Professional Service Contract & Continuing
Contract
Nontenured: Annual Contract & Probationary Contract
Total
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f
278

%
52.7

250
528

47.3
100

To determine if there was a significant difference between the instructional
practice scores for tenured and nontenured teachers, an independent samples t-test was
performed. The results of the analysis are displayed in Table 7. The mean instructional
practice score for the 278 tenured teachers within this study was 1.56 with a standard
deviation of 0.578. The mean instructional practice score for the 250 nontenured teachers
within this study was 1.74, with a standard deviation of 0.715. The overall mean for the
total population was 1.65, with a standard deviation of 0.653.

Table 7
Mean and Standard Deviation for Instructional Practice Scores of Tenured versus
Nontenured Teachers
Contract Status
Tenured
Nontenured
Total

N
278
250
528

Mean
1.56
1.74
1.65

Standard Deviation
0.578
0.715
0.653

The result of the independent samples t-test yielded a t value of -3.306, with a p
value of 0.001 at 526 degrees of freedom; t(526) = -3.306, p = 0.001. Therefore, the null
hypothesis was rejected; there was a significant observed difference between the
instructional practice scores of tenured and nontenured teachers. Although there was a
statistically significant difference between the mean instructional practice scores for
tenured versus nontenured teachers, a Cohen’s d effect size of -0.275 was calculated, and
it was determined that this finding was of low practical importance. In brief, tenured
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teachers were rated more favorably than nontentured teachers on the instructional
practices portion of the summative teacher evaluation. Table 8 displays these data.

Table 8
Independent Samples Test Comparing Mean Instructional Practice Scores for Tenured
vs. Nontenured Teachers

Descriptor

Equal
Variances
Assumed

t

df

-3.306*

526

Significance
Mean
(2-tailed)
Difference
.001

-.186

Standard
Error
Difference

95%
Confidence
Interval

.056

Lower Upper
-.297

-.076

*p < .01
Research Question 3
What percentage of professional service contract/continuing contract (tenured)
and annual contract/probationary contract (nontenured) teachers identified with
the lowest 10% of VAM scores in Central Florida school districts have been
placed on improvement plans?
A total of 11 Central Florida school districts provided summative evaluation data
for the 2013-14 school year via public record requests in accordance with Florida Statute
§119.07 for the 528 teachers in the total population included in this study. Within the
summative evaluation data collected, two teachers were prescribed improvement plans
for the 2013-14 school year, representing 0.38% of the total population. One
improvement plan was prescribed for a tenured teacher (0.40%, N = 278), and one
improvement plan was prescribed for a nontenured teacher (0.36%, N = 250). Figure 5
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consists of a pie chart which shows the percentage of teachers for whom an improvement
plan was prescribed within the total population observed.

Figure 5. Pie Chart Representing Percentage of Teachers Prescribed an Improvement
Plan
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Research Question 4
Does the feedback reflected in the instructional practice evaluations and
improvement plans target student achievement for teachers with the lowest 10%
of VAM scores in Central Florida school districts?
A total of 11 Central Florida school districts provided summative evaluation data
for the 2013-14 school year via public record requests in accordance with Florida Statute
§119.07 for 528 teachers within the total population included in this study. Within the
summative evaluation data were various feedback statements delivered to each teacher
regarding instructional performance for multiple categories assumed to define teacher
effectiveness. Each school district had a different evaluation system, and the highest
levels of feedback for each individual’s overall summative evaluation were examined for
analysis. The following rubric and accompanying definitions were used to gather data on
feedback categories and levels, developed and used with permission from a prior study
conducted by Rafalski (2015):
Level 1 - No feedback: The observer provides no opinion in the comment section
of the protocol.
Level 2 - Unrelated feedback or general statement: The observer gives some
information in the comment section, but it is not relevant to the element or meaning
cannot be interpreted.
Level 3 - Recount of observation events: This could include a narrative of what
the teacher and students were doing during the observation, general statements of events,
or notes the observer took to justify the rating given. In some instances, the observer
included statements to support the effectiveness of a strategy.
83

Level 4 - General affirmation or praise statement: The observer either leaves a
single word or phrase to indicate approval or adds a complement to the end of a recount
of observation of events.
Level 5- Reflective feedback: The observer asks the teacher to think about the
practice or a specific element in either a general or specific way.
Level 6- Standardized feedback: The observer uses the cut and paste option in the
protocol to leave systematized feedback.
Level 7- specific targeted feedback: The observe leaves differentiated and
meaningful statements intended to improve the impact of an instructional strategy.
Table 9 presents the highest levels of feedback observed for the total population
of teachers observed for this investigation (N = 528). Of the 528 teacher evaluations
analyzed, the highest levels of feedback percentages were as follows: 47.5% Level 1 (no
feedback); 6.3% Level 2 (unrelated feedback or general statement); 18.4% Level 3
(recount of observation events); 12.5% Level 4 (general affirmation or praise statement);
2.1% Level 5 (reflective feedback); 1.7% Level 6 (standardized feedback); and 11.6%
Level 7 (specific targeted feedback).
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Table 9
Frequencies and Percentages of Highest Feedback Levels Observed
Feedback Level
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Total

f
251
33
97
66
11
9
61
528

%
47.5
6.3
18.4
12.5
2.1
1.8
11.6
100.0

Cumulative %
47.5
53.8
72.2
84.7
86.7
88.4
100.0
100.0

Summary
In this chapter, data were analyzed to respond to four research questions
associated with the analysis of low performing Central Florida teacher evaluation
feedback and improvement plans as related to value-added model scores and instructional
practice scores. Descriptive and inferential statistics were used in the analysis.
Research Question 1 addressed what relationship, if any, existed between the
lowest 10% of teachers’ VAM scores and instructional practice evaluation scores in
Central Florida school districts for the 2013-14 school year. The actual population of
teachers, for whom data were included in this study, was reduced to 528 from the initial
total of 758 teachers due to a variety of limiting factors. To determine the magnitude of
association between VAM scores and instructional practice scores, a Pearson r
correlation coefficient was calculated, resulting in a very low (near zero) correlation:
r(526) = .104, p = 0.016. Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected at the p < .05 level.
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There was a very weak relationship between VAM scores and instructional practice
scores for teachers within the lowest 10% of VAM scores for the 2013-14 school year.
Research Question 2 focused on what difference, if any, existed between
professional service contract/continuing contract (tenured) and annual
contract/probationary contract (nontenured) teachers’ instructional practice scores within
Central Florida school districts for the 2013-14 school year. From the total population of
teachers with complete data sets (N = 528), 278 teachers were considered tenured, and
250 teachers were considered nontenured. To determine the difference between the mean
instructional practice scores of tenured versus nontenured teachers, an independent
samples t-test was used, resulting in the null hypothesis being rejected. There was a
significant difference between the mean instructional practice scores of tenured versus
nontenured teachers at 526 degrees of freedom with a t value of -3.306 (p = 0.001): t(526)
= -3.306, p < .01. Although this finding was significant, the Cohen’s d effect size was
calculated to be -0.275, providing evidence of low practical and clinical importance.
Research Question 3 investigated the percentage of professional service
contract/continuing contract (tenured) teachers and annual contract/probationary contract
(nontenured) teachers within the population who were placed on improvement plans.
Descriptive statistics were used to calculate frequencies and percentages of tenured and
nontenured teachers who were prescribed improvement plans. Two improvement plans
were found within the personnel files of the investigated population. One improvement
plan was for a tenured teacher, and one improvement plan was for a nontenured teacher,
resulting in 0.40% of tenured teachers (N = 278), and 0.36% (N = 250) nontenured
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teachers within the lowest 10% of VAM scores in Central Florida for the 2013-14 school
year being placed on improvement plans. The overall percentage of teachers being
placed on improvement plans for the entire population was 0.38%, (N = 528).
Research Question 4 was used to demonstrate if the feedback provided in
instructional practice evaluations and improvement plans targeted student achievement
for teachers with the lowest 10% of VAM scores within Central Florida for the 2013-14
school year. Descriptive statistics, including frequencies and percentages of highest
feedback levels as described by Rafalski (2015) were used to provide evidence of
feedback types most commonly rendered to individual teachers in the population. Level
1 (no feedback) was most frequently rendered, resulting in 47.5% of the total feedback
comments examined. Level 3 feedback comments (recount of classroom events) were
ranked second most observed, resulting in 18.4% of the total feedback comments
examined.
Table 10 presents an overall summary of the study, including research questions,
variables, data sources, methods of analysis, and results. Chapter 5 is comprised of an
elaborated summary, including discussion of the findings, implications for policy and
practice, and recommendations for future research.
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Table 10
Research Questions, Variables, Data Sources, Methods of Analysis & Results
Methods
#

Research Questions

Variables

Data Sources

of Analysis

1

What relationship, if any,
exists between the lowest
10% of teachers’ VAM
scores and instructional
practice evaluation scores in
Central Florida school
districts?

Independent:
Instructional Practice
Scores for the 2013-14
school year, ranged 1-4.
1 = highly effective
2 = effective
3 = needs
improvement/developing
4 = unsatisfactory

Value-added
model (VAM)
scores;
Instructional
practice scores

Pearson r
Correlation

Instructional
practice scores
and teacher
contract
statuses

Independent
samples t
test, Cohen’s
d

Results
N = 528
r(526) = -.104 p = 0.016
H0 accepted, very weak (nearly
no) relationship between VAM
scores and IP scores.

Dependent:
VAM scores for the 201314 school year, ranged
from -2.28 to -0.63
2

What difference, if any,
exists between PSC/CC and
AC/PC teachers’
instructional practice scores
within Central Florida
school districts?

Mean instructional
practice scores for
tenured (PSC/CC) vs.
nontenured teachers
(AC/PC) with the lowest
10% of VAM scores for
the 2013-14 school year.
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N = 528
Tenured f = 278
Nontenured f = 250
t(526) = -3.306, p = 0.001
H0 rejected, significant
difference between IP scores
for tenured vs. nontenured
teachers was observed.
Cohen’s d effect size = -0.275;
low practical importance.

Methods
#

Research Questions

Variables

3

What percentage of PSC/CC
and AC/PC teachers
identified within the 10% of
lowest VAM scores in
Central Florida school
districts have been placed on
improvement plans?

Instructional practice
evaluation content,
disaggregated by contract
status.

Does the feedback reflected
in the instructional practice
evaluations and
improvement plans target
student achievement for
teachers with the lowest
10% of VAM scores in
Central Florida school
districts?

Feedback levels

4

Data Sources

of Analysis

Results

Instructional
practice
evaluations

Descriptive
statistics,
frequencies
and
percentage
of teachers
assigned
improvement
plans by
contract
status and
total
population

N = 528
Tenured f = 278
Nontenured f = 250
Two improvement plans
discovered, one plan for
tenured (0.40%), one plan for
nontenured (0.36%).
Total percentage of
improvement plans for
population= 0.38%

Feedback
content from
instructional
practice
evaluations

Descriptive
statistics,
including a
frequency
distribution
of feedback
rubric ratings
to illustrate
findings

L1 = 47.5%
L2 = 6.3%
L3 = 18.4%
L4 = 12.5%
L5 = 2.1%
L6 = 1.8%
L7 = 11.6%
Greatest frequency L1 (no
feedback), followed by L3
(recount of classroom events).

Yes/No contains
improvement plan.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
This chapter extends upon chapters one through four by elaborating on the
research study though an overall summary of the study, discussion of the findings,
implications for policy and practice, and recommendations for future research. The
summary of the study includes a restatement of the problem, purpose of the study,
theoretical framework, research questions, and research methodology. The following
section is dedicated to a discussion of the findings, grounded in the literature cited in
chapter two. Finally, recommendations for further research are extended, followed by
final conclusions for the entire research study.
Summary of the Study
To date, there has been limited research conducted on how Florida value-added
model (VAM) student achievement data, instructional practice ratings, feedback, and
improvement plans have been used to determine and remediate teacher performance.
Additionally, there is little known regarding how barriers to candid and appropriate
feedback, such as individual conflict avoidance, bureaucratic procedural interferences,
and administrative procedural faults contribute to administrative decisions to assign
teachers with low VAM scores to improvement plans and subsequently pursue dismissal
of such ineffective teachers.
The purpose of this study was to determine if grossly ineffective teachers,
according to Florida VAM scores, had related instructional practice evaluations that were
being used to determine placement on improvement plans. Additionally, this study was
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conducted to determine if there was a difference between professional service
contract/continuing contract (tenured) and annual contract/probationary contract
(nontenured) teacher instructional practice scores and assignment to improvement plans
for teachers within the lowest 10% of VAM scores in Central Florida school districts.
Finally, the levels of feedback held within the local district performance evaluations and
improvement plans were reviewed to search for evidence of administrative barriers
within the three dimensions of individual conflict avoidance, bureaucratic procedural
interferences, and administrative procedural faults that existed and inhibited
administrative evaluators from providing candid and actionable teacher performance
evaluations relative to student achievement.
To understand the relationship between low student achievement measures and
school leadership response to ineffective teaching, the study was grounded by the social
systems theory of administrative behavior (Getzels & Guba, 1957). The basis of this
theory was that there are multiple components that contribute to a behavior exhibited by
an administrator, and balancing these components is necessary to achieve institutional
goals (Getzels & Guba, 1957). The groundwork for the theoretical framework was the
innate conflict and need for balance between the nomothetic and idiographic dimensions
of a social system. It was theorized by Getzels and Guba that all administrative behavior
was a function of the institutional role (nomothetic) and personality (idiographic)
dimensions, where B = f (R x P). Per this equation, school administrators were theorized
to be caught between individual and institutional conflicts of roles and expectations,
(such as supervision, evaluation, and targeted feedback delivery toward the goal), versus
91

their own personalities and needs (harmony and belongingness). The administrator must
achieve a balance of both role and personality to exhibit behavior conducive to
achievement of the institutional goal (Getzels & Guba, 1957).
Following are the research questions and null hypotheses used to guide the study:
1. What relationship, if any, exists between the lowest 10% of teachers’ VAM
scores and instructional practice evaluation scores in Central Florida school
districts?
H01: There is no observed relationship between the lowest 10% of teachers’ VAM
scores as correlated to local instructional practice scores within Central Florida
school districts.
2. What difference, if any, exists between professional service
contract/continuing contract (tenured) and annual contract/probationary
contract (nontenured) teachers’ instructional practice scores within Central
Florida school districts?
H02: There is no observed difference between professional service
contract/continuing contract (tenured) and annual contract/probationary
contract (nontenured) teachers’ instructional practice scores within Central
Florida school districts.
3. What percentage of professional service contract/continuing contract (tenured)
and annual contract/probationary contract (nontenured) teachers identified
with the 10% of lowest VAM scores in Central Florida school districts have
been placed on improvement plans?
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4. Does the feedback reflected in the instructional practice evaluations and
improvement plans target student achievement for teachers with the lowest
10% of VAM scores in Central Florida School districts?
Data for the study were collected to respond to the research questions. Valueadded model scores from the Florida Department of Education (FDOE) were obtained
through correspondence with the Division of Accountability, Research, and Measurement
office. Instructional practice evaluations, including instructional practice scores and any
feedback delivered by administrators, teacher contract statuses, and existing improvement
plans were obtained via public record requests made to each of the 13 Central Florida
school districts pursuant to Florida Statute §119.07. Of the 13 Central Florida school
districts that held membership in the Central Florida Public School Boards Coalition, 11
school districts provided complete and viable data sets in response to the public record
requests, yielding a total of 528 instructional practice teacher evaluations for data
analysis as described by the research questions.

Discussion of the Findings
Research Question 1
What relationship, if any, exists between the lowest 10% of teachers’ VAM scores
and instructional practice evaluation scores in Central Florida school districts?
H01: There is no observed relationship between the lowest 10% of teachers’ VAM
scores as correlated to local instructional practice scores within Central Florida
school districts.
For the population of 528 teachers, value-added model (VAM) scores ranged
between -2.28 and -0.63, which were correlated with instructional practice scores that
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ranged from one to four (1 = highly effective, 2 = effective, 3 = needs
improvement/developing, 4 = unsatisfactory). Value-added model scores displayed a
mean of -0.90 and a standard deviation of 0.27. Alternatively, instructional practice
scores displayed a mean of 1.65 (between highly effective and effective), and a standard
deviation of 0.65. Of the 528 summative instructional practice evaluations investigated,
43.2% of teachers were rated highly effective, 51.1% were rated effective, 3.6% were
rated needs improvement/developing, and 2.1% were rated as unsatisfactory.
Furthermore, the Pearson r correlational analysis displayed a coefficient of -0.104,
resulting in the null hypothesis being accepted (p < .05); there was a very weak observed
relationship between the lowest 10% of teachers’ VAM scores as correlated to
instructional practice scores within Central Florida school districts. These data were in
agreement with the findings of prior researchers as reported in the review of literature. A
comparison of prior evidence as related to these findings is summarized in Table 11.
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Table 11
Comparison of Prior Research as Related to Teacher Effectiveness Ratings
Researcher
Langlois &
Colarusso
(1988)

Findings
98.2% of teachers received a perfect evaluation score when districts used Pennsylvania
State Education Department standard rating form.

Gallagher
(2004)

Strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship between teacher evaluation
scores and student achievement using Value-added model (VAM) teacher effects
correlated with teacher evaluation scores in reading (correlation coefficient of .50,
p=.01).

Milanowski
(2004)

Combined VAM estimates and teacher evaluations scores for a sample of teachers in
grades three through eight correlated at .43 for math, .32 for reading, and .27 for
science.

Donaldson
(2010)

Superintendent Hopkins (Maine, 2001) conducted a review of summative evaluations of
all teachers upon becoming superintendent. Hopkins stated that the summative
evaluations were like reading valentines; the evaluations were full of vague,
meaningless praise, and overall, were absent of constructive criticism and actionable
feedback.

Weisberg et
al. (2009)

More than 99% of teachers received a satisfactory rating on a binary scale (satisfactory,
unsatisfactory). 94% of teachers received one of the top two ratings on a multi-tiered
scale.

Papay (2011)

Correlation coefficients ranged between .15 and .58 when correlating VAM scores with
various standardized assessments in mathematics, reading, English-language arts, and
the Stanford Achievement Test subtests for reading and mathematics.

Mela (2013)

99% of teachers in Brevard County, FL were rated effective or highly effective.

Winters &
Cowen
(2013)

Students assigned to teacher who would have been dismissed one or two years earlier
according to a VAM-based policy of ineffective teacher dismissal (teachers at or below
the fifth percentile) yielded an average 0.188 standard deviation decrease in
achievement one year later, compared to students with teachers above the fifth
percentile.

Pace (2015)

92.5% of teachers in Brevard County, FL were rated effective or highly effective.

Butler (2017)

94.3% of all teachers in Central Florida within the lowest 10% of VAM scores in the
2013-14 school year were rated effective or highly effective. -0.104 Pearson r
correlation coefficient when investigating the relationship between VAM scores and
instructional practice scores for the lowest 10% of teachers, according to VAM scores
in the 2013-14 school year (p < .05).
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The Lake Wobegon Effect is a term characterized by “a phenomenon in which
most individuals or groups perform above average” (Wheeler & Haertel, 1993). In the
case of summative teacher evaluations, numerous researchers have found that the Lake
Wobegon Effect is prevalent. Teachers are almost always rated effective or highly
effective, even in the presence of VAM-based evidence that suggests otherwise. Since
Senate Bill 736 passed in 2011, the FDOE has restricted the standards for performance
evaluations in an effort to ensure high-quality instruction for every student, and this has
led to more rigorous standards for local instructional practice evaluations that must be
approved by the FDOE. Even with VAM scores attached as a large percentage of the
overall summative evaluation, a great majority of teachers have continued to be rated as
effective and highly effective on the instructional practice portion of the evaluation.
When nearly all teachers are rated effective and highly effective, the entire evaluation
system becomes nullified. Teachers who are truly effective are not given the proper
commendation, respect, and reverence for their dedicated work. In contrast, teachers who
are truly ineffective are permitted to stay in the classroom with poor student growth and
achievement results, and little, if any, consequence for poor teaching performance. The
fact that ineffective teachers, according to Florida VAM measures, are not able to be
identified by administrators, also fosters a system of evaluation that does not seek to
invest in human capital by remediating teacher instructional practice and pedagogy for
more favorable student growth outcomes.
Moreover, statutory changes since the passages of NCLB and RTTT have targeted
the teacher evaluation process as a means to increase student achievement via a highly
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qualified teacher in every classroom, to no avail (Hazi & Arrendondo Rucinski, 2009).
Therefore, it is plausible that there is a complex and innate problem in administrative
behavior patterns that inhibit accurate teacher performance evaluations, (e.g., the three
dimensions of individual conflict avoidance, bureaucratic procedural interferences, and
administrative procedural faults). Without further research to determine the root cause of
the Lake Wobegon Effect, this problem encompassing teacher evaluation will be ongoing
and pervasive, as stakeholders strive to increase student growth and achievement.
Research Question 2
What difference, if any, exists between professional service contract/continuing
contract (tenured) and annual contract/probationary contract (nontenured)
teachers’ instructional practice scores within Central Florida school districts?
H0: There is no observed difference between professional service
contract/continuing contract (tenured) and annual contract/probationary contract
(nontenured) teachers’ instructional practice scores within Central Florida school
districts.
Within the total population of 528 teachers and the lowest 10% of VAM scores,
278 (52.7%) of the teacher evaluations examined were those of tenured teachers. The
remaining 250 teacher evaluations examined were those of nontenured teachers (47.3%).
The findings in response to Research Question 2 indicated a statistically significant
difference between the instructional practice scores of tenured and nontenured teachers in
Central Florida school districts. Tenured teachers were more likely to receive a higher
instructional practice score (M = 1.56; closer to 1, which coded for highly effective) than
nontenured teachers (M = 1.74; closer to 2, which coded for effective). Therefore, the
null hypothesis was rejected. This finding speaks to the social systems theory of
administrative behavior and the hypothesized barriers to candid teacher evaluation
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practices: individual conflict avoidance, bureaucratic procedural interferences, and
administrative procedural faults.
Because all teachers in the population were in the lowest 10% of VAM scores
statewide, each of these respective teachers received negative VAM scores for the 201314 school year. The findings from Research Question 1 indicated that there was a low
probability of any teacher within the population receiving an instructional practice score
of needs improvement/developing or unsatisfactory. Therefore, these findings are
significant not only statistically, but also offer significance in professional practice.
Because the clear majority of teachers was rated either highly effective or effective, any
difference between these two categories suggested that administrators were more likely to
assign a lower instructional practice evaluation score to a nontenured teacher than to a
tenured teacher, though not within the realm of the lowest two categories provided for by
the state-approved evaluation systems. According to these analyses, the evaluation
system in professional practice was more binary in nature, as the lowest ratings
administrators were willing to assign to teachers was, on average, effective.
Although school administrators have often cited tenure as a major barrier to
ineffective teacher dismissal, opponents of this view cite weakness in skill and ineffective
management/supervision on behalf of school-based administrators as the root cause of
this misconception (Davis, 2015; Zirkel, 2010). Such opponents have supported the
philosophy that administrative behaviors and beliefs regarding tenured teacher dismissal
are ill-contrived. If tenured teachers are more likely to score higher on an instructional
practices portion of the Florida state-approved evaluation system due to administrator
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rankings, despite being within the lowest 10% of VAM scores statewide, the problem
would appear to be rooted in the actual implementation of the evaluation system by local
school-based administrators, not the legal job protections prescribed by tenure status.
Moreover, any dismissal of a tenured teacher under Florida Law would likely not be
supported by instructional practice scores, as nearly every teacher is evaluated to be
effective or highly effective on the instructional practices portion of the overall
summative teacher evaluation.
Research Question 3
What percentage of professional service contract/continuing contract (tenured)
and annual contract/probationary contract (nontenured) teachers identified with
the lowest 10% of VAM scores in Central Florida school districts have been
placed on improvement plans?
The results of further analysis related to Research Question 3, beyond the that
already presented for Research Questions 2 and 3, further supported the argument that the
instructional practices portion of the Florida state-approved teacher evaluation system
was defunct in nature. Of the 528 teacher evaluations investigated, only two teachers
within the lowest 10% of VAM scores were assigned to an improvement plan. One
teacher was tenured; the other teacher was nontenured. Each of the improvement plans
were from separate districts within Central Florida. The total number of teachers
prescribed an improvement plan accounted for less than 1% of the total population.
Evidence of bureaucratic procedural interferences was present, specifically within
one improvement plan investigated. This improvement plan contained a string of e-mail
correspondence between school and district-based administrators. The teacher who
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received this improvement plan had two consecutive years of needs improvement
evaluations that initiated the professional improvement plan process (PIP) in this school
district. The internal reporting form, submitted upon case completion, stated that the PIP
was incomplete, nearly five months after its initiation. Reasoning for the incomplete PIP
was due to the extensive nature of the improvement plan and administrative procedural
faults associated with its implementation. The PIP required seven informal observations,
and three formal observations to be conducted by the teacher’s evaluator, aligned with
two specific instructional practice goals: (a) noticing when students are not engaged and
(b) maintaining a lively pace. Though all other informal and formal observations were
completed by the administrator, the third formal observation was never conducted.
Therefore, the PIP was considered incomplete, and the outcome of the entire process was
nullified without resolution.
Numerous instances of bureaucratic procedural interferences and administrative
procedural faults were evident throughout the e-mail correspondence. For instance,
toward the PIP completion deadline, the school-based administrator sent an email to
district-level personnel, stating that the third formal observation had not been conducted.
When the district-level administrator asked if there was a reason for not meeting the
formal requirement, the school-based administrator stated: “We did take notes--we just
met and talked about the results of the most recent evaluation. We failed to do a third
formal.”
Furthermore, throughout the earlier e-mail correspondence, there was a lack of
clarity for proper procedural implementation of the PIP by the school-based
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administrator. In one instance, the draft of the PIP was due in December. Upon request
by the district-based administrator to produce the draft, the school-based administrator
stated that she was under the impression that the PIP was due in January. The districtbased administrator corrected the school-based administrator, stating that the January
implementation date was in fact the date to begin remediating the teacher, but the draft of
the PIP was due in December to the district office for approval. The school-based
administrator replied: “Then I messed up. Is there any way to rectify it or is the
opportunity lost?” In fact, the very first e-mail correspondence from the district-level
administrator, dated October 9, 2013, clearly charted the due date of December 20, 2013
for the PIP draft, with the implementation date beginning on January 15, 2014.
Thus, the qualitative evidence from one improvement plan in a Central Florida
school district provided clear instances of administrative procedural faults and
bureaucratic procedural interferences. Administrative procedural faults occur when an
administrator lacks the skill necessary to reach the institutional goal. Bureaucratic
procedural interferences occur when state and local district policies and personnel do not
fully support school-based administrative actions and decisions. The competing demands
encompassing the roles of school-based administrators, (i.e., time for completion of an
improvement plan with numerous informal and formal observations with fidelity, and the
ability to concentrate on the important process of increasing human capital by
remediating instructional practice), make for a bureaucratic system confined by
paperwork and deadlines governed by district-level personnel.
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Research Question 4
Does the feedback reflected in the instructional practice evaluations and
improvement plans target student achievement for teachers with the lowest 10%
of VAM scores in Central Florida school districts?
Feedback provided within the instructional practices portion of the summative
teacher evaluations for 528 teachers in Central Florida whose scores were in the lowest
10% of VAM scores for the 2013-14 school year were analyzed using a feedback rubric
developed by Rafalski (2015). The feedback rubric was used to determine the frequency
and quality of feedback delivered to teachers by administrative evaluators. Though 11
school districts provided full summative evaluation data for the instructional practices
portion of the overall teacher evaluations, the volume of documentation for some school
districts was substantially less than that of other school districts. For example, one
Central Florida school district provided entire evaluations, including all observational
data and final commentary feedback by evaluators. Other school districts provided one
sheet of evaluative information for each teacher with numerical calculations for each
evaluation component. When asked if the single sheet evaluations were the complete
evaluation file, these school districts replied that the single sheets were the only data that
were held by the central district offices; there were no other data to support a feedback
level of greater than one (no feedback). When asked how feedback was delivered to
teachers based on these simple evaluation documents, these school districts replied that
evaluators were trained to hold conferences with the teachers to deliver feedback. Using
the data provided, the researcher determined that the greatest frequency of feedback
delivered to the population of teachers was Level 1 (no feedback) at 47.5%, followed by

102

Level 3 (recount of observation events) at 18.4%, and Level 4 (general affirmation or
praise statement) at 12.5%. Of all the feedback observed, only 11.6% was specific
targeted feedback (the highest level provided for by the rubric).
Based on these data and conversations regarding the volume and integrity of
evaluation paperwork, it became clear that bureaucratic procedural interferences were a
common factor within school districts. Supporting documentation for review of
evaluations by district-level personnel were not available in some school districts.
Should school board members, superintendent, union representative, teacher, or other
stakeholders choose to examine the files (to supervise the content within teacher
evaluations in these districts), they would find no data to support any employee
performance decisions.
Furthermore, it was of much concern to find that the greatest feedback levels were
distributed at the lower end of the feedback scale developed by Rafalski (2015), with
84.7% of the total feedback being between Levels 1 and 4. Although bureaucratic
procedural interferences may account for much of the Level 1 feedback, the remaining
results allude to the other two dimensions that are barriers to candid and actionable
feedback delivery by evaluative personnel. Feedback Levels 1-4 include no feedback,
unrelated feedback or general statements, recount of observational events, and general
affirmations or praise statements. These feedback levels are quite benign in nature and
are much simpler to deliver than feedback Levels 5-7 which include reflective feedback,
standardized feedback, and specific targeted feedback. One could surmise, when
observing the differences in these feedback levels developed by Rafalski, that there is a
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clear dichotomy between the lower and upper levels of feedback in terms of how skillful
and willful an evaluative administrator is in practice.
It is much less intrusive, and emotionally safer for administrators, to provide
lower levels of feedback that do not include statements of instructional practice that may
conflict with the beliefs teachers have that they are performing exceptionally well.
Herein is the root of administrative conflict avoidance. Are administrators content to
provide lower levels of feedback so as to not disturb teachers’ sense of well-being and
self-worth, or do they hold true to the belief that teachers are the single most important
component in a student’s educational growth and performance, and evaluate with deep
integrity and seek to increase human capital by providing timely, candid, and actionable
feedback on performance? Do administrators shy away from the higher levels of
feedback because it may lead to a point of contention between teachers and
administrative evaluators?
Administrative procedural faults may also account for the high distribution of
lower-level feedback. Although some of the evaluations delivered by school districts
were simple, single-paged documents, other school districts provided evaluation
paperwork that, in some cases, exceeded 20 pages. It was common to observe evidence
of administrators typing each spoken word by teachers and students, essentially scripttaping the entire lesson. However, in these instances, administrators were providing low
levels of feedback, merely sweeping over the lesson by recounting observational events
(Level 3 feedback). Though appearing to be quite arduous and cumbersome, it seemed
that evaluators were trained to provide this type of evidence for evaluations, without ever
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providing any type of commentary following the recount of classroom events as to how a
teacher may improve instructional practice. These administrative procedural faults are
two-fold. The first fault is that of the district personnel and administrative professional
development personnel who may train administrators to provide this type of feedback.
The second administrative procedural fault is that of the actual evaluator who lacks the
ability to recognize that this type of feedback does not allow for teachers to ascertain any
true meaning from their script-taping, general praise, or unintelligible commentary.
Regardless of whether a teacher is evaluated as highly effective, effective, needs
improvement/developing, or unsatisfactory, it should be considered an industry standard
for teachers to receive valuable, candid, and actionable written feedback on instructional
performance. All employees, regardless of how well they are teaching at any particular
moment, should expect to be evaluated in an accurate and fair manner, with their unique
teaching styles and characteristics highlighted. Their shortcomings should be
respectfully acknowledged, and they should be advised regarding an appropriate plan for
success. Teachers should expect to be delivered feedback that will further improve
performance over time and develop a team mentality of administrator-teacher reciprocal
accountability for increasing student growth and performance. It would be unimaginable
in another profession to expect an evaluator to sit in the workplace and merely type each
word that was said, delivering ratings based on such evidence. Though teaching in the
public education arena is certainly not a business, e.g., where profit and shareholder value
are tangible indicators of performance), student growth and performance are positive
indicators of how well a teacher is educating students. If administrative evaluators are
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not properly trained to provide specific, targeted feedback that respects the dignity and
nobility of the teaching profession, the instructional practices portion of the overall
teacher evaluation will never be the tool it was intended to be. Similarly, public
education will never be the great equalizer it was envisioned to be.

Implications for Policy and Practice
There is little disagreement that teachers are the single most important force and
factor in a student’s educational progress. Schools require great teachers to be working
with students each day to ensure that the future of each child is bright. However, it has
become abundantly clear that evaluation systems, particularly in the state of Florida, do
not appropriately distinguish who the truly great teachers are among the total population.
Moreover, teachers who have low student growth measures, as indicated by VAM scores,
are consistently being rated as effective or highly effective on the instructional practice
portion of the summative evaluation with little to no feedback to render these ratings
valid or reliable. The conclusion is, that nearly every teacher, regardless of student
growth measures, is considered effective or highly effective. The findings support that
the Florida system of teacher evaluation is not efficient and that it is not supportive of or
rewarding for teachers. Regardless of whether teachers’ VAM scores are high or low, the
instructional practice portion of the evaluation inflates local evaluations, and this has led
to far fewer needs improvement/developing or unsatisfactory summative ratings overall.
Three interrelated policy and practice implications have emerged from the results
of this study. Stakeholders, such as Florida policymakers, executive-level school district
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administrators, school-based administrators, teachers’ unions, and educational researchers
should consider the following three implications:
1. The results of this study suggested that there are clear concerns with
relatedness of VAM scores to the instructional practices portion of teacher
evaluations. District-based executives should be advised to have simple
correlations run each year to determine if there is any relationship between
VAM scores of teachers within their local school district and the current
instructional practice ratings. Additionally, executives should sample
evaluations within their school districts each year, and read the evaluations
with a careful eye attuned to the types of ratings being earned, along with the
feedback given upon issuance of a particular rating. Executives should
determine which school-based evaluators are rating teachers appropriately
when correlating instructional practice scores to VAM scores as well as those
evaluators who are providing exemplary feedback targeted to the institutional
goal of increasing student growth and achievement. Once these school-based
evaluators are determined, these administrators may be asked to mentor
struggling evaluators and train new administrators in evaluating teaching
performance in an appropriate and valid manner.
2. It is recommended that school districts in Central Florida re-examine and redesign their improvement plan processes. The qualitative data evidence from
one improvement plan and the subsequent email correspondence regarding the
process provided insight as to how arduous an improvement plan may be for
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school-based administrators who are encumbered with various other duties.
Furthermore, the lack of improvement plans in general is cause for concern.
A substantial contributor to the lack of improvement plans is that nearly every
teacher is rated effective or highly effective. Therefore, there is no evidence
to suggest that administrators can identify struggling teachers and develop
plans to increase instructional performance. This creates a cascading effect of
problems in how instructional practice evaluations are being implemented.
School district executives should be advised to prepare annual reports on the
total number of teachers with improvement plans so as to determine if there is
a need to reduce the paperwork on behalf of the school-based administrator to
ensure that the proper actions are being followed to remediate teaching
performance and increase human capital.
3. Low levels of feedback (1-4) were far more frequent than higher levels of
feedback (5-7) on teaching performance. One reason for the low levels of
feedback identified in this study may have been due to school district offices
not maintaining complete evaluation and observation data. Although
maintenance of complete and accurate data files may be one segment of the
overall lack of high-quality feedback, a second area of concern is related to
administrators’ preparation and training in delivering feedback in certain
Central Florida school districts. For example, one school district’s evaluations
were largely script-taped recounts of observational events. It appeared that
the evaluators in this district were trained to provide evidence to support a
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particular rating, as opposed to feedback on how teachers could improve their
instructional performance. District executives would be well-advised to speak
with the professional development teams in their respective school districts to
determine how school-based administrative evaluators are trained to execute
the instructional practices portion of the evaluation system. Additionally,
school districts should consider re-designing evaluator trainings with more
emphasis on how to deliver objective, clear, candid, and actionable feedback,
in addition to instructional performance evidence, to all teachers, regardless of
summative performance ratings.

Recommendations for Future Research
The goal of this study was to determine if VAM scores were related to
instructional practice evaluation scores and improvement plans. Data were collected and
analyzed to test four research questions relative to this goal. Upon analysis and
discussion of the findings, recommendations for future research as related to this study
were deliberated. The findings, though meaningful for educational policy and practice in
the state of Florida, were limited methodologically. The greatest limitation of this study
was due to the nature of public record requests and the availability of pertinent data held
at district-level offices. Of the 758 total teachers identified in the population, 230
teachers were removed from this study due to limitations previously cited (e.g., such as
termination of employment prior to the conclusion of the evaluation process, retirement,
and lack of supporting evaluation documentation from district central offices).
Additionally, each school district had different ways of documenting their different
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evaluation systems. Some included all observational and evaluation data; others included
only a summative numerical score, absent of comments and feedback. Due to these
differences and the likelihood of missing statistical evidence, the ability to generalize or
form conclusions from this study was limited. Thus, suggestions are made for further
research.
Further research into this subject should include a more in-depth study of
comparison for VAM scores and instructional practice scores. To better correlate VAM
scores to instructional practice scores, the population in future studies should include all
teachers and not be delimited to a particular subsection of the Florida teacher populace.
Furthermore, one section of the overall teacher evaluation that was not included in this
study was the final one-third of the evaluation. This section may be compiled
considering other indicators of performance, such as professional and job responsibilities
recommended by the State Board of Education or identified by the district school board,
peer reviews, objectively reliable survey information from students and parents based on
teaching practices that are associated with higher student achievement, and other valid
and reliable measures of instructional practice (Florida Statute §1012.34, 2015). Within
the written evaluations, one teacher expressed her concern for this final one-third which
included a team evaluation instrument where peers rated one another based on
collaboration and mutual accountability:
The team evaluation instrument does not relate to what a teacher does in his/her
classroom on a daily basis. It is truly a “performance” based evaluation
dependent upon how effectively one entertains the assessor and displays the more
concrete elements such as board configuration. In fact, the team evaluation is
demeaning and punitive in nature. Innovative is in the eyes of the beholder110

teaching is heart deep. The academic and behavioral responses of my students
(past and present) validate my teaching proficiency.
This qualitative evidence spawns more questions about the overall teacher evaluation in
Florida. The statute has been written to be open to interpretation and, at the discretion of
the local school boards and school districts, to decide how a teacher will be rated for the
final one-third of his or her evaluation. A significant point of interest for future
researchers would be to examine how different Florida school districts determine what
will be used for this part of the evaluation and what effect each system has on the overall
determination of an instructional practice score.
Another avenue of research could be to develop a study that includes more
concrete data, displaying evidence of administrative barriers that exist and inhibit
administrative evaluators from providing candid and actionable teacher performance
evaluations relative to student achievement within the three dimensions of individual
conflict avoidance, bureaucratic procedural interferences, and administrative procedural
faults. Though this study made inferences from various qualitative and quantitative data
points on these barriers, more valid and reliable data could be determined by conducting
interviews, surveys, and case studies with current administrative evaluators.
Many questions have been illuminated in this study regarding the Florida teacher
evaluation system since the Student Success Act was enacted in July 2011. That nearly
every teacher, despite VAM score outcomes, has been rated effective or highly effective
on paper is a clear indication that the Lake Wobegon Effect is prevalent in Central
Florida school districts. The question that requires further study is why this phenomenon
is occurring. Researchers must investigate and determine the common factors behind this
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phenomenon to provide a greater understanding of how educational policy-makers,
district-level administrators, school-based administrators, and various other stakeholders
may mitigate this problem of professional practice.

Summary
The findings of this study elaborated upon the work of numerous previous
researchers on the topic of teacher evaluation, both in the state of Florida and in other
locales. With the fairly new implementation of the value-added model (VAM) scores
being used to calculate how individual teachers affect student academic growth, it has
been determined that there is a lack of relationship between VAM scores as compared to
instructional practice scores for individual teachers. Administrators are unable to discern
which teachers in a population are truly effective or highly effective as defined by student
growth and achievement. This finding was of even more interest with the discovery that
tenured teachers were rated higher than nontenured teachers on the instructional practice
portion of the overall summative teacher evaluation system used by Central Florida
school districts. Additionally, improvement plans were not being implemented regularly
to remediate teacher performance and increase human capital. Finally, nearly all
feedback associated with the teacher evaluations examined was low-level and absent of
feedback relative to student growth and achievement.
The literature reviewed indicated that school administrators have been viewed to
be deeply conflicted between their institutional roles and expectations (supervision,
evaluation, and feedback toward the goal) versus their own individual personality and
needs (harmony and belongingness) (Getzels & Guba, 1957). Among the institutional
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roles and expectations, paired with individual needs of an administrator, are the three
dimensions of administrative conflict avoidance, bureaucratic procedural interferences,
and administrative procedural faults, which have been inferred to contribute to the
findings of this study. The literature and subsequent findings suggest that an evaluation
system is only as impactful as the evaluators who are conducting the observations and
determining the summative outcomes. To improve upon the current evaluation system,
administrators must be aware of, and well-prepared for, the demands of evaluating,
remediating, and providing feedback to teaching professionals relative to student
achievement and growth in a manner that is simultaneously respectful, candid, fair,
timely, and actionable.
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APPENDIX A
UCF INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD EXEMPTION OF RESEARCH
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APPENDIX B
SAMPLE LETTER FOR PUBLIC RECORDS REQUESTS
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Date
To Whom It May Concern:
I am seeking the full summative instructional practice evaluations, including (1)
total instructional practice determination (highly effective, effective, needs
improvement/developing, unsatisfactory), (2) improvement plans (if applicable),
(3) contract status (probationary contract, annual contract, or professional service
contract), (4) instructional feedback/comments by evaluators held within the
evaluations of the following teachers in accordance with Florida Statute §119.07.
The format for the following list is as follows: SCHOOL NAME TEACHER
NAME (Last, First, Middle Name or Initial, if applicable).
The records I am requesting are for the 2013-14 school year, and the school
listed is the school in which the subsequent individual was assigned to in the
2013-14 school year.
Should you deny my request, or any part of the request, please stat in writing the
basis for denial, including the exact statutory citation authorizing the denial as
required by Florida Statute §119.07(1)(d).
Thank you,
Signature of Requestor
Contact Information (email or phone) of Requestor
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APPENDIX C
SAMPLE RUBRIC FOR FEEDBACK DETERMINATION RATING
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Note. Rubric used in data analysis with permission of Rafalski (2015).
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